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then refute two transaction cost theories presented by Stephen Bainbridge, first that hierarchy is
a superior way to get information to decision-makers, and second that it is necessary to reduce
shirking. In fact the empirical evidence shows that employee participation, even as it exists in
its current, limited form, is associated with enhanced productivity. However, this leaves us with
the puzzle about why every firm is not genuinely participatory. I offer an explanation, derived in
part from public choice theory, based on the fact that the costs and benefits of participation affect
the firm’s owners and employees differently. The owners of the enterprise are unlikely to profit
from the sort of decisions that employees would likely make if they had the power to do so, even
if these decisions enhanced productivity, and by implication, profitability. Greater profits for the
firm would often mean fewer profits for the owners and managers, who accordingly have a strong
incentive to resist genuine employee participation.
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ABSTRACT 
Why are most capitalist enterprises of all sizes organized as 
authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine 
employee participation that would give the workers real authority? 
Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all 
decision-making power in the hands of management.  The standard 
answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort 
of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less 
productive and lose out to more traditional competitors.  This answer 
is indefensible.  After surveying the history, legal status, and 
varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-
begging the argument that the rarity of genuine participatory 
management itself shows that it is inefficient.  I then refute two 
transaction cost theories presented by Stephen Bainbridge, first that 
hierarchy is a superior way to get information to decision-makers, 
and second that it is necessary to reduce shirking.  In fact the 
empirical evidence shows that employee participation, even as it 
exists in its current, limited form, is associated with enhanced 
productivity.   However, this leaves us with the puzzle about why 
every firm is not genuinely participatory.  I offer an explanation, 
derived in part from public choice theory, based on the fact that the 
costs and benefits of participation affect the firm’s owners and 
employees differently.  The owners of the enterprise are unlikely to 
profit from the sort of decisions that employees would likely make if 
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they had the power to do so, even if these decisions enhanced 
productivity, and by implication, profitability.  Greater profits for the 
firm would often mean fewer profits for the owners and managers, 
who accordingly have a strong incentive to resist genuine employee 
participation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are capitalist firms actually interested in improving productivity 
and quality, and by implication, profits?  If so, should the firms that 
adopt organizational structures and practices that do not lead to these 
improvements triumph in the market over firms that resist them and 
forego their advantages?1  These questions are prompted by a deep 
                                                          
 1. This Article is a companion piece to Justin Schwartz, Why the Capital-
Managed Rather than the Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant 
Organizational Form in Market Economies, 73 OHIO STATE L.J. 220 (2012) 
[hereinafter, Schwartz, Mill], in which I analyze a related question about the curious 
failure of the labor-managed and worker-owned cooperative, a demonstrably more 
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puzzle about the traditional business practices of the overwhelming 
majority of capitalist firms, both corporate and classic,2 which we may 
collectively call “traditional.”  As Armen Alchian stated, economists 
generally accept that the market selects for enterprises with features that 
are more efficient than the competition.3  There is extremely strong 
evidence that genuine employee participation4 is significantly more 
efficient in enhancing productivity and product quality than 
authoritarian hierarchy, and that the more “say” or actual decision-
                                                                                                                                      
efficient form of organization than at least the open corporation and perhaps any sort of 
capitalist firm, to crowd, so to speak, its capital-managed competitors out of the market, 
as predicted by John Stuart Mill. The answer offered in that Article to the somewhat 
similar question considered there is quite different from the one proposed here because 
of important differences between labor-managed and capital-managed firms. See, e.g., 
sources cited infra note 2, and Schwartz, Mill, supra at 240 n. 93, passim, although I 
shall refer to evidence and conclusions presented in the Mill paper where relevant. 
 2. For the distinction, between the “open corporation,” and “classic capitalist 
firm,” see Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 
J. L. & ECON. 327 (1983) and Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership from Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (identifying the open corporation 
with the publically traded corporation owned by outside investors and primarily 
managed by professional managers); see also Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON REV. 777 
(1972), in ARMEN ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 73 (1977) (identifying the 
classical capitalist firm as one owned by an individual or small group of individuals and 
to some extent managed by them). For most of my purposes we may ignore the 
differences between these kinds of organization, which share the pertinent features 
discussed in this paper. 
 3. See Armen E. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 211 (1950) [hereinafter Alchian, Uncertainty], reprinted in ECONOMIC 
FORCES AT WORK 15, supra note 2. As we shall see, if the explanation offered here is 
correct, the Alchian “evolutionary” thesis must be qualified. See infra Part III.B, and 
infra Conclusion. 
 4. Also called “employee involvement” (“EI”), see RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL 
ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT? 107–16 (1999), and participatory management, see 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. 
CORP. L. 657, 673, 676–77 (1996) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Participatory Management], 
among other things; see also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra at 92, Ex. 5.1; infra notes 57-
71 (setting forth some varieties of employee participation). For my purposes, I need not 
distinguish, between “‘[e]mployee participation’ [that] utiliz[es] direct participation . . . 
and ‘employee representation’ that utilize[s]  indirect involvement through worker 
representatives.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral 
Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 
741, 742 n.7 (1998) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Moral Rights]. 
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making power employees have, the stronger the effect.5  However, 
American firms are almost universally top-down, hierarchical, 
bureaucratic, and undemocratic in their organizational structure.6  Many 
enterprises have adopted various forms of employee participation plans.  
A commonly cited figure in the mid-1990s was 30,000,7 but other 
estimates are much higher.8  And while the rhetoric of participation 
became “nearly hegemonic” by the 1980s,9 these plans virtually never 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Michael H. Leroy, “Dealing with” Employee Involvement in 
Nonunion Workplaces: Empirical Research Implications for the Team Act and 
Electromation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 36 n.21 (1997) [hereinafter LeRoy 
Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces], (citing Employee Participation 
Programs Spur Fast Growth Companies, Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., “Trendsetter 
Barometer” Survey Shows, http://www.colybrand.com/eas/trendset/106.html (“The 
Coopers & Lybrand survey found that 8 in 10 of the fastest growing firms in the U.S. 
have employee participation programs, and also found a correlation between those 
firms that most highly value these organizational structures and those firms’ growth 
rate,”)).  Much more evidence is set forth in detail, infra Part II.C. 
 6. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 669 (“[L]arge 
U.S. business corporations are typically characterized by multi-layered bureaucratic 
hierarchies.”) As Simon describes the authority relations in the traditional firm as, 
“[Worker] accepts authority when his behavior is determined by [Boss’s] decision.” 
HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 184 (1957) (quoted in 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS 71 (1975)). This is still true, in the main, of almost all traditional firms. 
 7. See Divki K. Virk, Note, Participation with Representation: Ensuring 
Worker’s Rights in Cooperative Management, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 730 n.3 (1994) 
(“Approximately 30,000 American employers have established some type of 
cooperative management program.”). 
 8. Derek Jones & Takao Koto, The Impact of Teams on Output, Quality, and 
Downtime: An Empirical Analysis Using Individual Panel Data, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 215, 215 (2011) [hereinafter Jones & Koto,  The Impact of Teams] (citing studies 
showing “dramatic increase” and “rapid diffusion” in the use of some of these programs 
in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan since the 1980s). See infra notes 45–53 and 
accompanying text, for discussion. 
 9. Mike Parker, Industrial Relations Myth and Shop Floor Reality: The Team 
Concept in the Auto Industry, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE 
AMBIGUOUS PROMISE, 249, 256 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds. 1993); 
see also Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 674–75. 
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ceded any real authority to the workers or gave them “voice”10 as 
opposed to “say".11 
The puzzle, then, is this: Capital-managed and -owned firms could 
embody genuine employee participation.  Why do they not?  Why are 
such programs comparatively rare and why are most existing programs 
not genuinely participatory?  Why have the few capitalist firms that do 
give workers real say not become, through competition12 and imitation13 
the prevalent organizational form?  Why does authoritarian hierarchy 
persist as the main form of enterprise organization even in firms with 
some form of employee participation?  The answer I urge in this paper, 
inspired by the work of economist Stephen Marglin14 and aspects of 
public choice theory,15 is that this arrangement financially benefits 
capitalists, or more generally, those who decide about organizational 
structure, while placing the costs of hierarchy, including decreased 
efficiency, on the employees–and with corporations, not infrequently on 
                                                          
 10. The term “voice” is derived from Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
Here it is meant as the right to express a view without the actual power to implement 
that view, which I call “say.” 
 11. “One nearly universal characteristic of operational participation is a lack of 
meaningful employee control over the outcome of the decision-making process. Even 
the seemingly autonomous self-directed work teams give employees little input into 
policy or strategic decisions, especially those related to matters of corporate 
governance.” Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 688. 
 12. See Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 25. (Firms that “have their fixed 
internal conditions closer to . . . the optimum position now have a greater probability of 
survival and growth. They will grow relative to other firms and become the prevailing 
type . . .”). 
 13. Id. at 28–30. 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Function of 
Hierarchy in Capitalist Production, Part 1, 6 REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 33 (1974). 
 15.  For public choice theory generally, see, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II 229–35 (rev. ed. 1998); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC 
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). Public choice 
theory is most commonly applied to explaining the behavior of governmental 
institutions. See, e.g., the articles in STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra, but there is no logical 
reason whatsoever that it should not be applied to any collective decision-making unit 
or process, including within a firm or by a board of directors. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra 
at 232–33 (describing private sector sent seeking); accord ARNOLD, infra note 185 at 
148 (stating that board members take quasi-rents from the firms they are supposed to 
oversee) (the distinction between rents and quasi-rents, see id. at 117–21, is immaterial 
here). I underline that in using public choice theoretic insights, I do not offer an 
unqualified endorsement of the theory or any version of it. 
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the shareholders. This account can be characterized, among other ways, 
as explanation by rent-seeking by those in power.16 
In this paper I neither advocate nor criticize employee participation 
programs in capitalist firms.  My objective is to answer a pair of 
explanatory questions: (1) why are there so few? and (2) why do they 
offer employees so little?  If pressed, I would probably agree with 
author and labor activist Mike Parker that employee participation “could 
not be as effective as it is or have so many adherents unless it had some 
genuinely positive features,”17 but, as actually implemented, such 
programs “are not [generally] about improving the quality of our 
working lives.”18  In addition, I would agree with law professor Stephen 
Bainbridge that “one size will not fit all.”19  Even in the context of 
capital-managed firms, choosing which programs or features of such 
programs are economically or otherwise desirable depends on the 
context, sort and size of firm, the cultural traditions of the employees 
and managers, and so forth.  However, my views on the desirability of 
existing employee participation and the sort of participation, if any, that 
might be appropriate in various circumstances, are immaterial here.  My 
question here is positive rather than normative: given that employee 
participation is more efficient than traditional hierarchy even if it 
involves voice without say, and the more say it involves the more 
                                                          
 16. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 
(1986) (defining rent-seeking). See infra Part III.B generally for more explanation of 
rent-seeking in public choice theory. 
 17. MIKE PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE: A UNION GUIDE TO QWL [QUALITY OF 
WORK LIFE] 2 (1985) [hereinafter PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 704. Bainbridge thinks 
that “highly authoritarian and rigidly hierarchical structures,” are appropriate in some 
contexts and perhaps that some forms of “participatory democracy” may be appropriate 
in others. Id. I think on ethical as well as economic grounds that authoritarian hierarchy 
is virtually never appropriate in an employment context. As I indicate briefly in the 
Conclusion of Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1 at 283 (another explanatory and positive 
rather than normative paper), I would generally advocate full labor management. 
Because of the explanatory focus of the present Article, I do not argue for this here.  For 
that argument, see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH 
SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 752 (W.J. Ashley ed., 
Longmans, Green & Co., 9th ed. 1915) (1885) [hereinafter MILL, POLITICAL 
ECONOMY]. I present one version of my own argument against authoritarian hierarchy 
in Justin Schwartz, What’s Wrong With Exploitation?, 29 NOÛS 158 (1995) 
(complementary to but different from Mill’s argument). 
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efficient it is, why are participation, and participation with say, not more 
prevalent?20 
The plan of this Article is as follows.  I begin in Part I with a short 
review of some important background: a brief survey of the rise of and 
rationale for employee participation and its main varieties in the U.S. 
economy, as well as its legal status under American labor law.  This will 
highlight how comparatively unusual and practically empty employee 
participation is when it comes to the power that existing programs give 
employees.  It will further highlight the limited scope of involvement 
that these programs offer, despite evidence from later surveys that 
greater efficiency benefits correlate with programs that have a wider 
scope and give more power to workers.  I then turn to the obvious 
theoretical explanation derived from mainstream economics, that 
meaningful employee participation is rare because it is less efficient than 
traditional hierarchical alternatives.  I consider useful formulations set 
forth by philosopher Robert Nozick,21 political scientist Robert Lane,22 
and the economic analyst David Ramsay Steele.23  Part II(A) will 
involve some reflection on the meaning of “efficiency” that drives the 
Alchian argument, and Nozick’s, Lane’s and Steele’s articulations of it. 
Nozick, Lane, and Steele do not identify sources for the 
comparative inefficiency of participatory management that purportedly 
favors traditional organization.  The range of possible explanations is 
large, so for the sake of manageability I consider the representative 
“transactions cost”24 explanation urged by Stephen Bainbridge, perhaps 
the leading analyst and critic of employee participation as an 
organizational structure.25  Bainbridge is my main target because he is 
the most thoughtful advocate of traditional over participatory 
organization.  Bainbridge contends, in a nutshell, that hierarchical 
                                                          
 20. My answer to that question indirectly illuminates my policy view of employee 
participation programs as they are actually implemented. See infra Part III. 
 21. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 248 (1974).  
 22. ROBERT LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 330 (1991) [hereinafter LANE, 
EXPERIENCE]. 
 23. DAVID RAMSAY STEELE, FROM MARX TO MISES: POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC CALCULATION 332–33 (1992). 
 24. Such explanations emphasize that interactions within or among enterprises 
involve some “friction” and are therefore costly. See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, 
Economic Organization and Transaction Costs, in 2 The NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 55 (1987), and infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4; Stephen Bainbridge, 
Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 979 (1998) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Organizational Failures]. 
970 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
organization (1) is the most efficient solution to gather and collate 
information for decision-makers while (2) minimizing the agency costs 
of shirking.26  This explanation begs the question, who should the 
decision-makers be?  In addition to this logical flaw, it flies in the face 
of the overwhelming empirical evidence of the efficiency advantages of 
employee participation.  In Part III, I expound my differential cost-and-
benefit analysis.   The answer turns on how capitalism distributes the 
burdens and benefits of organizational decisions, so that “[t]he costs and 
gains fall systematically on different persons, with those bearing the 
financial risk having the decisive power.”27 
I.   A VERY BRIEF SURVEY OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION: HISTORY, 
THEORY, VARIETIES 
To make a very long story28 very short, “hierarchy” was the 
“historic[al] watchword”29 of American labor relations and enterprise 
organization.  Until the last decades of the 19th century, most enterprises 
                                                          
 26. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1004-09; infra 
Part II.B.2. 
 27. DAVID SCHWEICKART, AGAINST CAPITALISM 231 (1993). Schweickart, a 
philosopher, mathematician, and economic analyst, is the pre-eminent advocate of 
worker control at least in the English-speaking world. As the title of the cited book 
indicates, he is also a socialist.  I emphasize that the issue here, employee participation 
in capitalist firms, is not remotely a socialist proposal, if socialism requires the abolition 
of private property and wage labor. See Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party 
(1848) [hereinafter Marx, Manifesto], in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 484 (Robert 
C. Tucker ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter MARX-ENGELS READER] 
(“[T]he theory of the Communists may be summed up in a single sentence: Abolition of 
private property.”). If socialism is identified with modern social democracy it is wholly 
consistent with capitalism. See, e.g., DONALD SASSOON, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
SOCIALISM: THE WEST EUROPEAN LEFT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1998). Clearly, 
Germany, France, or even Sweden have capitalist economies despite their extensive (if 
diminishing) welfare states. And an economy largely consisting of capital-owned and-
managed firms with genuine employee participation would be a capitalist economy. 
 28. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (magisterial study in 608 large pages); 
RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 23–24 (1979); WILLIAM LAZONICK, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND THE MYTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY (1991); WILLIAM G. ROY, 
SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 
(1997). 
 29. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 673. 
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were small entrepreneurial operations.30  Before the 1840s, apart from 
armories and textiles, the division of labor (and thus bureaucratic 
management) barely existed within firms.31  Workplaces with employees 
tended to be small, and the entrepreneurial owner could see and direct 
everything going on in the shop.32  Mass production and bureaucratic 
hierarchy came with railroads and mass distribution.33  Larger 
workforces made personal supervision by individual capitalist 
entrepreneurs impossible.34 The modern, vertically integrated 
corporation, which by approximately 1920 included 90% of all 
manufacturing companies with assets of at least $20 million,35 
developed articulated structures of middle management to monitor 
employees.36  For employees at larger firms, this meant rigid, top down 
supervision.37  Such authoritarian, hierarchical management was 
systematized and articulated in the early part of the twentieth century 
under the system of “scientific management” designed by industrial 
engineer and management specialist Frederick W.Taylor.38  “Taylorism” 
involved using time-and-motion studies to break up tasks into small 
                                                          
 30. EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 23–24. 
 31. CHANDLER, supra note 28, at 75; EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 25 (“The system 
of control tended to be informal and unstructured.”). Edwards emphasizes that this 
remains the rule in most businesses.  As of the late 1970s, 11 million of the 12 million 
firms in the U.S. were small “entrepreneurial” operations managed with “simple 
control.” Id. at 34.  Large corporations carry disproportionate weight, however, with the 
Fortune 500 accounting for between about 40 to 60% of the GNP and companies over 
500 employees supplying slightly over half the nation’s nonfarm employment. William 
J. Murphy, Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property, 41 IDEA 297, 301 (2002); Richard Salterman, Perceptions 
Bearing on the Public Policy Dynamics of Corporation Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 
264 (1996). 
 32. See EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 23–25. This situation still obtains in the great 
majority of American workplaces, see id. at 34. 
 33. CHANDLER, supra note 28, at Chs. 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
 34. EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 29. 
 35. CHANDLER, supra note 28, at 363. 
 36. Id. at 411; EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 31. 
 37. EDWARDS, supra note 28, at 31. 
 38. FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (Harper 
& Bros. Publishers 1919) (1911) [hereinafter TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT]; 
HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 108 (1974) (definitive study of Taylorism from a Marxist 
perspective).  
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pieces that could be carried out with unskilled labor.39  The point, as 
Bainbridge puts it, was to “reverse the information asymmetry,”40 
stripping workers of information about production, eliminating the 
“need for thinking or learning by workers,”41 and putting that 
information in the hands of management so that the workers would be 
less able to shirk responsibility.42  In addition, labor would be cheaper 
because they were less skilled.43 
The rhetoric and practices typical of Taylorism, to a certain extent, 
fell out of fashion, to a certain extent, in the latter part of the twentieth 
century to be challenged by a variety of forms of employee 
participation.  It is unclear how widespread employee participation 
actually is.  A standard mid-1990s estimate was that about 30,000 firms 
used it.44  If accurate, this would be a tiny share of American business,45 
but employee participation is much more common at larger enterprises.46  
Moreover, the figure may be too low.   Other research indicates that 
these programs are much more pervasive;47 e.g., in 1992, 30% of U.S. 
establishments with at least 50 employees used a team form of employee 
                                                          
 39. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 38, at 108. For the term “Taylorism,” a common 
denomination for Taylor’s principles of “scientific management,” see id. at 86–87 
(noting that the term itself has fallen into “bad odor”). 
 40. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 983. 
 41. Id.; see also FREDERICK TAYLOR, SHOP MANAGEMENT 98–99 (1903) (“All 
possible brain work should be removed from the shop and centered in the planning or 
laying-out department” (quoted in BRAVERMAN, supra note 38, at 113). 
 42. Id. Taylor called “loafing, shirking or marking time,” “soldiering.” (Taylor, 
quoted in BRAVERMAN, supra note 38, at 97; see also id. at 99 (referring to the “slow 
pace” naturally or systematically adopted by the workers, the overcoming of which is a 
primary aim of scientific management). 
 43. BRAVERMAN, supra note 38, at 118 (quoting TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 38) (explaining how “scientific management” can cheapen 
labor costs through reducing or eliminating the need for skilled labor). 
 44. See Virk, supra note 7. 
 45. In 2008 there were 27,281,452 firms in the United States, of which 5,930,132 
hired employees. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics about Business Size (including Small 
Business) from the U.S. Census Bureau, available at http:/www.census.gov/epcd/www/ 
smallbus.html. 
 46. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Employer Domination of Labor Organizations 
and the Electromation Case: An Empirical Public Policy Analysis, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1812, 1813 (1993) [hereinafter LeRoy, Employer Domination] (“Approximately 
30,000 workplaces and eighty percent of Fortune 1000 companies now utilize such 
programs.”). 
 47. See Jones & Koto, The Impact of Teams, supra note 8, at 215 (citing studies). 
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participation called Quality Circles48 with at least 50% of core 
employees participating in them.49  The proportion of firms using 
Quality Circles at the 50% level or higher level of penetration rose to 
nearly 60% by 1997.50  Bainbridge is skeptical of even the lower 
numbers,51 but the evidence supports the higher figures.  In addition, 
there are approximately 11,000 firms with Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (“ESOPs”) covering roughly ten million employees.52  These are 
only U.S. figures.  Abroad there has been a “rapid diffusion of teams” in 
developed economies.53  The reasons for the increased popularity of 
forms of employee participation are connected with concerns that are 
very much at issue in this Article.  Cases for genuine participation have 
been constructed on the basis of non-economic, ethical concerns.54  
                                                          
 48. See infra note 66 (defining Quality Circles). 
 49. See Jones & Koto, The Impact of Teams, supra note 8, at 215. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 677 (“According to 
the Department of Labor (DOL) . . . only thirty seven percent of a nationally 
representative sample of 700 firms had a  majority of their workers engaged in two or 
more . . . practices [] which include participatory management programs.”).  At almost 
40% penetration according to his own figures, it is odd for Bainbridge to regard this as 
a low estimate. Bainbridge cites a study stating that what is happening is best described 
as “limited and piece-meal experimentation with employee involvement, rather than a 
fundamental shift in the nature of workplace relationships.” Id. at 676-77.  This is true 
in an important sense however widespread actually existing participatory management 
may be. 
 52. See Andrew Stumpff, Fifty Years of Utopia: A Look Back at Louis Kelso’s The 
Capitalist Manifesto and the Weird History of the ESOP, 62 TAX L. 419, 431, 431 
n.75 (2009). ESOPs are deferred compensation or qualified retirement plans under 
ERISA and the tax code. 
 53. See Jones & Koto, The Impact of Teams, supra note 8, at 215. 
 54. The literature in this area is very large. Some of it overlaps with policy and 
moral arguments for full worker ownership and labor management, which extend far 
beyond the more modest claims about meaningful participation I discuss here. Much of 
this is based on Marx’s discussion of “Estranged Labor” in KARL MARX, ECONOMIC 
AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, in MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 27 
at 66, 70–71. For discussions (pro and con) of such arguments, see, e.g., N. SCOTT 
ARNOLD, KARL MARX’S RADICAL CRITIQUE OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY: A 
RECONSTRUCTION AND EVALUATION 225, 227ff (1990) [hereinafter ARNOLD, CRITIQUE] 
(highly critical but sympathetic from a libertarian point of view); EDWARD S. 
GREENBERG, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION 65–
114 (1986) (empirical assessment of how U.S. workers’ cooperatives fared on Marx’s 
criteria); SCHWEICKART, supra  note 27, at 178–241; more limited topics under the 
heading of “meaningful work” are considered in EDMUND F. BYRNE, WORK, INC.: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 113–35 (1990); ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY (1985) (raising, however, a challenge to private property rights); 
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Because my focus is on efficiency explanations for the relative lack of 
genuine employee participation, I consider such factors as meaningful 
work, enhanced employee satisfaction, workplace democracy, greater 
equality, diminished alienation, or development of employee’s skills and 
capacities only insofar as they bear on efficiency.55  I discuss the 
meaning of “efficiency” in this context is discussed below.56 
Employee participation programs or, as Richard Freeman and Joel 
Rogers call them, Employee Involvement (“EI”) programs, “come in 
various flavors”57 and with a profusion of names: “quality circles and 
discussion groups, total quality management, self-directed work teams, 
safety committees, production committees, Christmas party committees, 
and diverse small groups that work on sundry other issues.”58  The 
employees in Freeman’s and Rogers’ sample of U.S. firms with EI 
programs reported that 78% had EI groups to discuss different problems 
over a long period of time, while 19% reported only short term 
committees, 18% only long term committees, and 60% had both.59  An 
additional form of employee involvement, different because it involves a 
greater or lesser degree of ownership, and may or may not involve 
employee participation, is the ESOP.60  Despite the diversity in scope 
                                                                                                                                      
Bainbridge himself has devoted an essay to the topic. Bainbridge, Moral Rights, supra 
note 4 (discussing arguments for participatory management from Catholic natural rights 
theory and humanistic psychology). 
 55. See MILL, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 19, at 752ff (mixing ethical and 
efficiency concerns in discussing a nonsocialist labor-managed economy). 
 56. See infra notes 103, 212–22 and accompanying text. 
 57. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 101. Firms that have EI programs are 
sometimes called “High Performance Workplaces,” see id. at 93, that use “advanced 
human resource practices,” id. at 97. Freeman and Rogers found on the basis of 
statistical analysis that firms do not neatly divide into “high performance firms” and 
“all others,” id., but appear to be the upper tail of a continuous distribution that takes 
the form of a Bell curve. Id. 
 58. Id. at 101. 
 59. Id. at 102. 
 60. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 69 (1996) [hereinafter 
HANSMANN, ENTERPRISE] (stating that in ESOPs “control over the firm generally 
remains in other hands”). In 1986, a federal government survey of 3,000 ESOPs found 
formal employee involvement in decision-making in no more than 15%,  “informal” 
participation in 76%, but even those are largely restricted to safety, working conditions, 
and other immediate (“operational”) worker concerns (overall 42–30%)  rather than 
(“strategic”) organizational goals or means to meet them (overall 13–11%); moreover, 
while 95% of the surveyed firms allowed workers to make suggestions and 33% 
allowed some degree of shared decision-making with management, in only 10% of the 
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and longevity of such programs, most “focus on issues relating to 
production.”61  These plans, and the participation they involve, are 
limited to shop floor issues.  These may be called “operational”62 plans 
as opposed to the much rarer sort of “strategic” employee participation 
addressing basic business issues of enterprise direction such as questions 
of financing, investment, choice of product lines or production methods, 
or marketing.63  The main forms of employee participation include, inter 
alia:64 (1) Quality of Work Life (“QWL”), intended to make work more 
satisfying and meaningful;65 (2) Quality Circles (“QC”), delegating to 
                                                                                                                                      
surveyed ESOPS did employees make decisions on their own. JOSEPH R. BLASI, 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF? 202–04 (1988) (citing U.S. GAO, 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES 
FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP 41–43 (1986)). For the terms “operational” and 
“strategic,” and related concepts see infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 61. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 102. 
 62. Operational participation is sometimes called “the Team Concept,” a term 
popular in the auto industry. See MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: 
UNIONS AND THE TEAM CONCEPT 3–7 (1988). 
 63. See Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 684–90; 
Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 987.  There is disagreement and 
ambiguity about the extent and nature of employee participation in firms having such 
plans in what Freeman and Rogers call “issues of corporate direction,” FREEMAN & 
ROGERS, supra note 4, at 102, (emphasis in original), a term they do not define but 
distinguish from issues of quality, safety, technology/new products (which sound like 
basic issues of corporate or enterprise direction), and job advancement or performance.  
Their sample reported results of up to about 64% of workers in firms with EI plans 
discussing mostly “operational” issues, and up to 32% discussing strategic issues. Id. 
Bainbridge, by contrast, states that “unlike the well-developed German system of 
codetermination, with its work councils and supervisory boards, strategic participation 
in the United States is rare and rudimentary.” Bainbridge, Participatory Management, 
supra note 4, at 688–89. His example is United Auto Workers (UAW) representation on 
the Chrysler Board in 1979. Id. at 689.  I believe that Bainbridge’s conclusions in this 
regard are more accurate, but the difference may turn on what is meant by 
“participation,” which Bainbridge may understand differently from Freeman and 
Rogers. 
 64. This typology is largely drawn from PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 
17, at 4 and Martin T. Moe, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: 
Section 8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1127, 1158–59 (1993). Bainbridge offers a somewhat similar taxonomy. See 
Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 986–90. 
 65. See Moe, supra note 64, at 1159. “Quality of work life (QWL) programs are 
probably the most common form of employee involvement,” Bainbridge, Participatory 
Management, supra note 4, at 684.  “Their focus tends to be on decisions that affect the 
quality of work life.” Id.  Bainbridge states that the QWL programs can range from 
“little more than training programs,” to “small volunteer groups that study plant or even 
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workers the responsibility to solve quality and production problems;66 
(3) Participation Groups, joint-labor-management groups that discuss a 
wide range of production and quality problems and working 
conditions;67 (4) Task Forces, groups established to deal with a single 
question such a new product launch;68 (5) Work Teams, groups of 
employees, in some cases including the immediate supervisor, delegated 
responsibility for some well-defined segment of production;69(6) the 
Team Concept, in which “a self-directed work team . . . giv[es] 
production employees the power to make decisions about day-to-day 
work operations, . . . [with] substantial discretion and little supervision” 
in making shop-floor decisions;70 (7) gain sharing, providing bonuses to 
employees when productivity increases;71 (8) worker representation on 
the Board of Directors;72 and (9) ESOPs,73 involving greater or lesser 
actual employee ownership. 
The legal status of these participatory forms (ESOPs aside, as these 
are frequently not participatory) is uncertain and context-dependent.  
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act74 prohibits 
employers from setting up company unions or labor organizations that 
                                                                                                                                      
firm wide problems, developing recommendations to be passed on to corporate 
managers with decisionmaking jurisdiction.” Id. 
 66. Moe, supra note 64, at 1158; PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 4; 
Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 684 (QCs are “a scaled down 
version of QWL based in departmentally . . . [that provide] an ideal structure for 
controlling decision-making while management’s power to implement decisions is 
maintained.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 687; Moe, supra note 
64, at 1159. 
 71. Moe, supra note 64, at 1160; Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra 
note 4, at 687 (noting that Quality Circles do not normally offer financial reward for 
ideas). 
 72. See supra note 63 (discussing “strategic” participation, German co-
determination and UAW board representation at Chrysler). 
 73. See supra notes 52, 60 and accompanying text (noting that ESOPs often 
involve little if any employee participation). 
 74. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That . . . . an 
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during 
working hours without loss of time or pay.”). 
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might undermine workers’ rights and their ability to choose their own 
representatives.  In Electromation,75 the leading case on employee 
participation organizations, the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), the agency with exclusive jurisdiction over private labor 
relations in the U.S., found that the “action committees” (participation 
groups, as denominated above) set up by the company76 were in 
violation of the Act.77  In an important qualifier, the Board noted that the 
record showed that “[t]he purpose of the Action Committees was not to 
enable management and employees to cooperate to improve ‘quality’ or 
‘efficiency,’ but to create in employees the impression that their 
disagreement with management had been solved bilaterally."78  One 
Court of Appeals seems to have seized upon this language to find some 
employer-instituted employee participation practices legitimate,79 but 
other Circuits and the NLRB itself have not followed this reasoning.   A 
few other Board cases have upheld challenged employee participation 
practices.80 
After the Republican sweep of the congressional election in 1994, 
the majority GOP Congress introduced the TEAM Act,81 purportedly “to 
facilitate cooperative developments in the workplace,”82 which was 
promptly vetoed by President Clinton because of union opposition.83  
Although the unions opposed the TEAM Act, they are far from being 
wholly hostile to employee participation on legal or policy grounds.  On 
                                                          
 75. Electromation, Inc., 309 NLRB 990 (1992). 
 76. See generally LeRoy, Employer Domination, supra note 46, at 1826–32. 
 77. Electromation, 309 NLRB at 998. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Torbitt & Castleman, Inc. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 899, 908 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(alluding to the cited language from Electromation, 309 NLRB 990, and stating that 
“the purpose was to improve Torbitt’s efficiency”). 
 80. See, e.g., Gen. Foods Corp., 231 NLRB 1232 (1977) (delegating managerial 
functions to employees lawful as long as there is no “dealing”); E. I. du Pont & Co., 
311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993) (information gathering and brainstorming without 
implementation power lawful); Vons Grocery Co., 311 NLRB 893, 896 (1995) (group 
devoted to “operational matters” was lawful; suggestions as to dress code and safety 
policy were unfair labor practices). 
 81. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995 (“TEAM Act”), H.R. 
743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 82. Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On? My Team or My Team?: the NLRA’s 
Section 8(a)(2),and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 364 (1997). 
 83. Id.; see also LeRoy Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces, supra 
note 5, at 67 n.251; 68 n.253 (“In all likelihood, he vetoed the bill because unions 
strongly opposed it. . . . [The] administration stated its alliance with the AFL-CIO in 
opposing the TEAM Act. . . .”). 
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the contrary, some union leadership is positively enthusiastic about the 
concept.  In 1996, Jonathan Hiatt, then General Counsel of the AFL-
CIO, stated that the NLRB’s decisions “make [it] clear that all 
employers, union and nonunion alike, are entirely free to implement 
participatory management systems and involve their employees fully in 
the work of the firm without creating employer dominated ‘labor 
organizations’. . . ."84 
However, this is not the scholarly consensus.  Stephen Befort 
succinctly expresses a more mainstream, and, to my own thinking, 
doctrinally accurate view:  
Many existing [Employee Involvement Plans (“EIPs”)] survive 
despite their illegality.  At least part of the reason for their survival is 
that these devices are viewed by employees as desirable mechanisms 
for providing some type of voice in the workplace.  Accordingly, 
few complaints are brought to the NLRB on these issues.85   
Many of the practices at issue are unlawful in a context where the law 
goes unenforced.  To give an idea of how much illegal discussion goes 
on, Freeman and Rogers, for example, state that 28% of workers who 
participated on an EI committee “reported discussing wage and benefit 
issues.”86  Given that perhaps tens or even hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. employers have implemented employee participation programs, it 
does not seem that the law is a serious obstacle to their institution, even 
if they involve unlawful conduct and discussions.87  Insofar as such 
                                                          
 84. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the Twenty-
First Century, 12 LAB. L.165, 169 (1996). 
 85. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical 
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 415, 417 n.424 (2002) (citing a 
Labor Department report saying that there have been an average of three NLRB 
decisions a year for the last quarter century); see also Samuel Estreicher, Employer 
Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of 
Section 8(a)(2)of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (1994); Gely, supra note 82, at 365; 
LeRoy, Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces, supra note 5. 
 86. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 103. These are mandatory bargaining 
subject. See 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (2006); see also Equitable Res. Energy Co., 307 
N.L.R.B. 730, 733, enforced, 989 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1993) (wages); Equitable Res. 
Energy Co., 307 NLRB 730, 733, enforced, 989 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1993) (pensions and 
other benefits). 
 87. “Little care I for the law.” STEVE GOODMAN, Lincoln Park Pirates, on 
Somebody Else’s Troubles (Buddha Records 1972) (song about a notorious auto towing 
service in Chicago). With only about three NLRB prosecutions a year and widespread 
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programs are desirable, a question on which I take no position here, that 
is an argument for legislative reform.88 
With respect to the concerns about efficiency in the adoption of the 
new rhetoric and programs, Bainbridge and I are in solid agreement on 
least three points.  First, the relative decline of the U.S. in the global 
economy89 and (Bainbridge’s point90), the changing nature of work in 
the “new economy,” with the growth of knowledge work even in 
manufacturing, has rendered the Taylorist model of making all labor 
unskilled and mechanical obsolete, if it ever was realistic. Second, most 
existing employee participation programs give the workers no real say.  
“[M]anagement retains decision-making control.”91  These programs 
offer old wine in new bottles.92 Few if any of the programs involve real 
encroachments on capital managerial power or affect hierarchical 
                                                                                                                                      
employee support for the programs, employers need not worry about aggressive 
enforcement.  Employers will unlawfully fire union supporters and especially union 
organizers in election campaigns when workers want unions. See Dean Baker, Co-
Director, Ctr. for Econ. Research, The Risk of Dismissal for Union Organization and 
the Need to Modify the Process, Testimony before the NLRB (July 19, 2011), available 
at http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/baker240711.html (estimating that the 
probability of a union supporter’s being fired during an organizing campaign is 1.4 to 
1.9%, and that of a union organizer being fired may be ten times that; further that pro-
union workers were fired in 26% of union election campaigns in 2001–07, up from 16% 
in the late 1990s.).  In a context where companies act illegally in opposition to worker 
desires for unionization with little fear of NLRB enforcement, they are unlikely to 
worry much about the law where employees by and large support their unlawful 
activities involving participation. 
 88. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 85; Matthew T. Mitchell, Comment, 
Employment Involvement Programs: The Time Has Come to Amend Section 8(a)(2)of 
the NLRA, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 503 (2004). 
 89. See, e.g., ROBERT BRENNER,THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE: THE 
ADVANCED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES FROM THE LONG BOOM TO THE DOWNTURN 1945-
2005, 62–66, 101–16, 122–28, 165–70, 194–215, 250–55 (2006). 
 90. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 985. 
 91. Id. at 994; see also Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 
683 (stating that “what one observes in the real world” is that “participatory 
management programs [do] not surrender meaningful power over strategic (or even 
tactical) policy to employees”). 
 92. A play on a Scriptural saying “And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; 
else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.” 
Luke 5:37 (King James).  As often, the Good Book offers unexpected insights existing 
programs offer workers no say because employers fear that the “new wine” of real 
employee participation will break the “old bottles” of capitalist and managerial power.  
Indeed, something like this is the argument I ultimately offer, see infra Part III.B. 
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organization.”93  Third, given the asymmetry in power between 
employees and employers, employee participation programs are “top-
down initiatives imposed by management,”94 a “new way” that 
“corporate managers . . . [devised to] motivate and organize workers.”95 
Labor’s attitude has been ambivalent.  As noted, in the mid-1990s, 
the AFL-CIO welcomed some employee participation programs.96  
Owen Bieber, UAW President in the early 1990s, predicted as a positive 
thing that unions would become involved with the “big decisions on 
investments and products and prices that we as a union have never had a 
meaningful input in making."97  This sort of thinking led, for instance, to 
the participatory contract at Saturn auto plants, where the GM-UAW 
contract gave the workers “far greater control over their worker 
environment than . . . other [GM or even Japanese] autoworkers."98  
Many employees who have experienced participatory programs have 
                                                          
 93. See supra note 11 (quoting Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 
4, at 688). 
 94. See Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1050. 
 95. Id. at 984; see also id. at 1031–32 (“In many firms, management has resorted to 
aggressive tactics to secure worker acceptance of participatory management . . .  
purportedly including threats to transfer work or close plants unless the programs are 
implemented.”); PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 62, at 14 (“[T]hese are 
management methods, adopted by employers . . . for the purpose of squeezing unions 
and workers . . . .”). 
 96. See, e.g., Hiatt & Jackson, supra note 84 at 168–69. 
 97. Jim Hilton, Note, Participatory Management and the NLRA: Does the Act 
Cover Saturn’s Auto-Workers?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 673, 674 (1993) (quoting Owen Bieber 
in Analyst Says UAW President Right on Workers Playing Decision-Making Role, UPI 
(May 22, 1990)). Bieber was speaking of strategic rather than operational participation. 
 98. Id. at 675–76.  GM began production of Saturn in 1985 and ended it in 2010. 
See Sharon Silke Carty, GM to shut down Saturn after deal with Penske falls apart, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2009-
09-30-penske-gm-ends-saturn-talks_N.html. The highly participatory contract was 
dismantled by a vote of Saturn workers in 2004, under GM threat to close the flagship 
Spring Hill plant in Tennessee, with a promise, which was not kept, to maintain 
production for ten years if the contract was rejected. Innovative Saturn-UAW Contract 
Dismantled, SaturnFans.com (June 26, 2004), http://www.saturnfans.com/Company/ 
2004/contractdismantled.shtml. Forbes analyst Jerry Flint attributes the failure of Saturn 
to GM mismanagement rather than to problems stemming from employee participation.  
Jerry Flint, Saturn: The Forgotten Promise, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2004), 
http://www.forbes.com/2004/08/17/cz_jf_0817flint.html. 
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received them enthusiastically.99  However, other union analysts and 
activists have been less sanguine.100 
One thing that Bainbridge does not concede is that the firms that do 
offer employee participation programs succeed better in terms of 
productivity and other measures of performance than ones that do not.  
Furthermore, the former tend to succeed better, even where these 
programs are less meaningful, perhaps even hollow and merely 
advisory, or highly limited in scope, and firms with more meaningful 
and broad employee participation programs succeed best.101  So why do 
they not all have strong, meaningful employee participation programs? 
 
II. IS EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION LESS EFFICIENT? 
A. NOZICK’S TRILEMMA, THE A PRIORI ARGUMENT, AND THE 
MEANING OF EFFICIENCY 
 
The libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick102 argues that traditional 
hierarchical organization is the outcome of its efficiency advantages for 
both capitalists and workers.  He does not analyze, however, what it is 
about the top-down structure of the classical capital-managed firm that 
confers the purported advantages vis-à-vis a participatory alternative.  
He addresses only the issue of what he calls “meaningful and satisfying 
work,”103 which he views as inconsistent with features of a traditional 
hierarchical organization such as “fragmentation of tasks, rote activity, 
and [the] detailed specification of activity which leaves little room for 
                                                          
 99. See PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 31 (discussing how QWL 
programs “undermin[e] the union idea” by “pick[ing] apart” labor solidarity that is 
essential to unionism, promoting competition among workers and creating a new, non-
union group identity); see also PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 62; see also KIM 
MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 87-
101 (1997) (expressing extreme skepticism about management motivations in 
supporting employee participation in a system of “lean production” globally). 
 100. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 116 (“Most workers want these 
programs and want them to be more extensive, giving workers greater say.”). This point 
is admitted by the labor movement’s sharpest critics of the programs. See PARKER, 
INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 9 (“Some of the most ardent defenders of QWL 
are the rank and file workers who participate in the programs.”). 
 101. See infra Part II.C. 
 102. See NOZICK, supra note 21. 
 103. Id. at 247. 
982 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
independent . . . initiative.”104  Nozick’s reasoning takes the form of a 
trilemma: 
[1] If the productivity of the workers in a factory rises when the 
work tasks are segmented so as to be more meaningful, then 
individual owners will reorganize the productive process. [2] If the 
productivity of the workers remains the same under such meaningful 
division of labor, then in the process of competing for laborers, firms 
will alter their internal work organization. [3] [If such 
reorganization] is less efficient (as judged by market criteria). . . 
workers [may be] willing to give up something (some wages) in 
order to work at meaningfully segmented jobs.105 
Since traditional hierarchal forms predominate, Nozick implies, 
participation must involve lower productivity and workers must prefer 
higher wages with less meaningful work.  Here Nozick uses productivity 
as proxy for efficiency without expressly filling in the connection, a 
point to which I will return.  Nozick assumes that “the only interesting 
case . . . is that in which dividing a firm’s work into meaningful 
segments, rotation of labor, and so forth, is less efficient (as judged by 
market criteria) than the less meaningful division of labor.”106  Robert 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 248. Or at least Nozick accepts for the sake of argument that these 
features are characteristic of capital management, while pointing out that they are 
endemic in “industrial society.” Id. Nozick’s view of traditional organization is one that 
he shares with Marx. See, e.g., 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, 544–53 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 1977) (1867) [hereinafter 
MARX, CAPITAL 1]. As Marx graphically describes it, hierarchical capitalist 
organization involves “the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, who are 
merely members of a total mechanism which belongs to him,” id. at 477, leading to 
“physical and mental degradation, . . . premature death, [and] the torture of over-work,” 
id. at 381. Nozick does not dispute this. Lane states that recent evidence “supports . . . 
Marx in this respect,” while noting that enjoyable work, at least, is a positive utility and 
preferred activity, LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 324 (citing study); see also 
infra notes 152–61 and accompanying text. 
 105. NOZICK, supra note 21, at 248 (emphasis in original); see also STEELE, supra 
note 23, at 332–33, discussed infra notes 116–24 and accompanying text. 
 106. NOZICK, supra note 21, at 248; for discussion, see Marglin, supra note 14, at 
64–65; see also infra notes 233–42 and accompanying text (discussing the meanings of 
productivity). The idea is that enhanced productivity, ceteris paribus, increases firm 
profitability, and indirectly, through invisible hand, rising-tide mechanisms, promote 
one or more of the abstract notions of efficiency that economists tend to use. See also 
Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, in MARKETS, MORALS, 
AND THE LAW 93, 97–98 (1988) (defining and explaining several kinds of efficiency, 
and listing, without discussion “productive efficiency” as an “efficiency-related 
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Lane gives another version of this argument: the market economy, he 
states, is a consumer and not a producer economy,107 where 
“[c]ompetition prohibits costs in one firm not incurred in another.”108  
Capitalists may decide about organizational forms, but, as a different 
analyst said, “the immanent laws of capitalist production confront the 
individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.”109  The “market 
does not and . . . cannot give to work the priority it merits on the 
grounds of its hedonic and developmental potentials,”110 because 
“anything that increases costs to a firm without increasing revenue (and 
thus income and profits) cannot be chosen in a genuinely competitive 
economy.”111 
These arguments are highly problematic.  Nozick and Lane contend 
that genuine employee participation does not prevail because either its 
(unspecified) comparative inefficiencies offset any noneconomic gains 
to workers or consumers that would force capitalist enterprises to adopt 
it or firms risk having their labor force defect to other firms with greater 
participation.  They assert that if genuinely participatory features were 
more productive, capitalist firms would adopt them on strictly economic 
                                                                                                                                      
notion”). See infra notes 213–22 for discussion of the main abstract economic 
conceptions of efficiency. 
  The use of productivity as a proxy for efficiency is common practice and as we 
shall see, virtually all empirical studies of the effects of employee participation, worker 
ownership, and other alternative employment organizational practices use it, although 
some also measure product quality. Relatively few use comparative profitability, 
perhaps because productivity is easier to measure and too many factors would have to 
be controlled to derive comparative profitability figures. I take up some difficulties with 
direct deployment of a more abstract notion of efficiency, here, utility maximization, in 
discussing Steele’s version of Nozick’s trilemma, supra note 23; see infra notes 116–24 
and accompanying text. 
 107. LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 330. Lane is a liberal political scientist 
whose main thesis is that it is work and not (above a certain level) money that produces 
happiness. His conclusion, that “the problem of how to get from here to there remains 
unsolved,” id. at 331, is, from his perspective, very pessimistic. Nozick naturally sees 
things differently. 
 108. LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 330. Lane accepts the argument I have 
critiqued at length, that the explanation for the paucity and thinness of what I have 
called “participatory” organization is that anything more robust would be inefficient 
and costly.  Despite the comprehensiveness of his research, Lane offers no argument or 
evidence beyond the fact that “meaningful work” is relatively rare to show that genuine 
participation would have these negative effects on competitive success. 
 109. MARX, CAPITAL 1, supra note 104, at 381. 
 110. LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 289. 
 111. Id. at 330. 
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grounds. This presupposes that genuine employee participation is in fact 
less efficient for reasons that are simply not stated.  As I show below, 
this empirical assumption is false.112  I also criticize Bainbridge’s 
attempt to specify a theoretical transactions cost explanation for 
assuming the supposed fact to be explained.113  Nozick and Lane derive 
their a priori conclusions deductively, to put it charitably, from the 
extreme rarity of meaningful worker participation in capital-managed 
firms, rather than from any empirical evidence. In other words, in an 
Alchian “evolutionary” just-so story, where assuming the market selects 
profitable practices (here measured using productivity as a proxy), the 
fact that genuinely participatory practices are uncommon implies that 
they are less productive, thus less profitable, therefore less efficient. 
That is a lot to swallow without a sketch of the explanatory 
mechanism.114  It asks us to accept a great many unspecified 
assumptions on faith.  If a variation is adaptive, they suppose, it will 
proliferate, other things being equal.  Perhaps, but first it must arise, 
and must not be opposed or suppressed by countervailing forces.  To 
suppose the contrary is to adopt the naïve adaptationism that holds 
that all traits that occur are adaptive and if a trait does not occur, it is 
not adaptive.115  We may hope for more of an explanation, and better. 
Discussed below, Bainbridge provides two explanations that do not 
succeed. 
The economic analyst David Ramsey Steele116 suggests a different 
efficiency argument, unfortunately similarly flawed, that purports to 
                                                          
 112. See infra Part II.C. 
 113. See infra Part II.B. 
 114. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 3–10 (1989) 
(emphasizing, inter alia, the need for an explanation to open up the black box and show 
the mechanism by which the cause produces the effect); see also Peter Railton, 
Probability, Explanation, and Information, 48 SYNTHESE 233, 242 (1981) (setting forth 
an account of explanation as “elucidating the mechanisms at work”). 
 115. See Stephen Jay Gould & Richard C. Lewontin, The Spandrels of San Marco 
and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adapationist Program, 205 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON 581 (1979) (critiquing these assumptions in a biological 
context). 
 116. See STEELE, supra note 23. Steele’s target here is the fully worker owned and 
managed co-op (discussed in Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1), not the more or less 
genuinely participatory capitalist enterprise that Nozick addresses and which is my 
present topic. However, Steele’s arguments translate to an inefficiency explanation of 
the phenomenon that I analyze here, where genuinely participatory employment 
practices are not predominant in the market of capitalist firms. Steele’s argument is 
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explain why participation is not more common and more thoroughgoing 
even in investor-owned capitalist firms: 
[T]he loss in utility to external consumers, which would arise from 
self-management, is not fully compensated by the concomitant gain 
in work satisfaction. Supposing this account to be correct, self-
management would be inefficient in the fullest sense: it would not be 
conducive to human welfare, defined to include work satisfaction. If 
self-management were efficient in the fullest sense, we would expect 
it to see it more widely implemented.117 
To survive and prosper, that is, traditional organization must be welfare- 
or utility-maximizing in comparison to participatory organization. Steele 
defines efficiency as “maximizing the utility of consumers.”118 Steele is 
careful to note that “[t]he satisfaction that worker gets from his work, or 
from the social structure of the workplace, is included in the estimate of 
efficiency.”119 However, to say that genuine participation would reduce 
utility, or even productivity or profitability merely because it rarely 
assumes what is to be proved.  This is naively adaptationist.  
Explanatory appeal to utility,120 like Nozick’s appeal to productivity, is 
merely question-begging without an account or mechanism linking 
utility maximization to actual economic behavior. 
In fact, Steele’s invocation of utility maximization highlights the 
virtues of Nozick’s invocation of productivity. Individual capitalists and 
                                                                                                                                      
similar to the one that Nozick regards as “the only interesting case,” see NOZICK, supra 
note 21, at 248 (where participation is less efficient by market criteria), but with an 
interesting twist - the appeal to overall social welfare or utility maximization. 
 117. STEELE, supra note 23, at 333. 
 118. Id. at 329. 
 119. Id. at 328. 
 120. Whatever one thinks of utilitarianism as a normative ethical theory providing a 
criterion to assess the relative merits of different states of affairs such as alternative 
forms of economic organization, the notion of utility maximization, fundamental to 
utilitarian moral theory and central to modern economics, is of little practical use: (1) 
because the concept is profoundly conceptually problematic, see, e.g., the papers 
collected in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 
1985); for a useful short and biting critique of utilitarianism, see DON HERZOG, 
WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS, JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY 110–60 (1985); but even 
setting conceptual problems aside, (2) there is no real way to tell, outside the broadest-
brush extremes, whether, as matter of empirical fact, a given state of affairs is superior 
in welfare to another. Assuming that the categories of utility and welfare have any 
coherent meaning, few would dispute that Swedish social democracy is welfare 
superior to the Gulag Archipelago, but debate is possible about whether it is welfare 
superior to Reagan-Thatcher neoliberalism. 
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managers who sought greater profits would plausibly adopt practices 
that they believed would enhance productivity, and firms whose 
decision-makers choose productivity-enhancing factors, for whatever 
reasons, are likely to prosper over their rivals in the market, other things 
being equal.  But it is implausible that the decision makers choose their 
employment practices on grounds that it will enhance overall social 
welfare.121 A rule that maximizes social utility need not be consciously 
followed for it to have that effect,122 but Steele lacks the link showing 
that the rarity of genuine participation is caused by a utility deficit vis-à-
vis traditional organization. Even if we suppose that such a deficit is an 
effect of genuine participation—something we have no reason to 
believe—he considers the claim that participation may enhance worker 
satisfaction while reducing profitability, thereby “reduc[ing] the utility 
of external consumers.”123 He offers (1) no non-question-begging reason 
to think participatory employment practices will do this, (2) no evidence 
that the overall utility of external consumers matters to individual 
firms,124 or (3) that adopting practices that maximize overall social 
utility will promote the success of individual firms. “Invisible hand” 
                                                          
 121. This is the precise inverse of the Smithian argument that self-interested 
practices will maximize social utility.”It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest.” 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 26–27 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds. Liberty Classics 1976) (1776). 
 122. It is not necessary, as J.S. Mill observed, that people consciously accept 
utilitarianism to act in accord with its dictates. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, in 
UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 251, 280-81 (Mary Warnock ed., Meridian 
1962) (1861); see also Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 19 (stating that “[s]uccess 
is based on results, not motivation” and arguing that economic agents need not be 
conscious profit maximizers for market outcomes to be explained by profit 
maximization). 
 123. STEELE, supra note 23, at 333. The slide from decreased profitability to 
decreased consumer satisfaction is very quick. Outside the counterfactual world of the 
general equilibrium model, see infra note 217 and accompanying text, it is far from 
evident that increased profitability translates into greater consumer satisfaction. Even if 
prices are lower because competition is robust, the model assumes away the 
externalities that result from the incentives firms have to make others pay for the costs 
of expensive or unpleasant aspects of their activities, such as pollution. See, e.g., K. 
WILLIAM KAPP, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (1950) (remaining the 
classic study of externalities). 
 124. As opposed to that of the customers for a firm’s particular markets—why 
should Neiman Marcus care about John Deere’s consumers, or vice versa? 
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considerations, to which Steele implicitly appeals, require more explicit 
detail than he provides. 
So far then, the mere fact that genuine participatory organization 
(“say”) is extremely unusual, even in capitalist enterprises that have 
adopted employee participation (at least “voice”), gives us no 
compelling reason to conclude on a priori grounds that it would be 
harmful to productivity, reduce social welfare, or be otherwise 
inefficient as compared to traditional hierarchical organization. What is 
needed is a theoretical account that ties the degree of employee 
participation to greater or lesser efficiency. Bainbridge provides such an 
account, which I consider in Part II.B.1&2.  Empirical evidence to 
support the hypothesis is also needed.  As I demonstrate in Part II.C, 
this is lacking.  On the contrary: the evidence is that participation 
enhances productivity and other measures of efficiency, and the more 
say that is given to the employees, the more it benefits the enterprise. 
B. BAINBRIDGE, TRANSACTION COSTS: INFORMATION AND OPPORTUNISM 
1. Information Processing, Question Begging, and the Austrian 
Objection 
 
Bainbridge offers what he calls an “organizational failures-based 
account.”125 The theory has two prongs: an enterprise needs to (1) 
minimize the transactions costs of gathering and transmitting 
information and (2) minimize shirking and opportunism by the 
employees. This is a transactions cost analysis, meaning broadly an 
economic analysis that turns on the idea that the “friction” involved in 
coordinating interactions (“transactions”) within or among individuals 
or institutions,126 involves costs that have an essential role in explaining 
outcomes through a quasi-Darwinian process of selection for most 
efficient, least-cost features, including organizational form. I consider 
these in turn, more briefly than I would if the empirical evidence 
supported their conclusions instead of contradicting them. Bainbridge 
also disputes the conclusions to the contrary that I offer here.  I address 
                                                          
 125. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1005. 
 126. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) (remaining most comprehensive 
modern survey of this approach); see also Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of 
Work, 1 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 5 (1980) [hereinafter Williamson, Organization]; 
see also WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra, note 6.  For a summary, see 
Cheung, supra note 24. 
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those arguments in presenting the evidence that genuine participation 
enhances productivity and efficiency generally. 
Bainbridge’s first prong explains the supposed superiority of 
traditional hierarchy over genuine participatory management by 
reference to the need for a “transaction cost economizing mechanism for 
providing information to those with the power to make decisions.”127 
The basic idea is that, in complex organizations with many decisions 
involving multiple alternatives, “decision makers can gather only so 
much information without being overloaded.”128 Bureaucratic hierarchy, 
limiting managerial control to small groups with different 
responsibilities, “gets reliable information to the right decision maker 
more efficiently than any other organizational system.”129  Apparently 
by way of support for this claim, Bainbridge asserts that promotion 
through the levels of the hierarchy helps ensure that “top-level decisions 
are in fact made by those with the fewest limits on their cognitive 
powers,”130 while assigning the less capable and energetic to “‘lower-
                                                          
 127. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1006. 
 128. Id. at 1005. 
 129. Id.  For this proposition, Bainbridge cites a treatise on corporate law, ROBERT 
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 802 (1986), rather than any empirical studies of 
industrial organization showing that executive success is correlated with cognitive 
power. 
 130. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007. This is highly 
misleading if it implies that traditional organizations put the conventionally “smart” 
into the highest positions. The evidence is that the difference between star and average 
executives is due to “emotional intelligence,” involving factors such as social skills and 
empathy, rather than to conventional measures of cognitive capacity such as IQ. See, 
e.g., Daniel Goleman, What Makes a Leader?, BEST OF HBR 1998, at 2, Reprint 
R0401H, http://bizedgegroup.com/Articles/ 
040507%20What%20makes%20a%20Leader.pdf (attributing 90% of the difference to 
“emotional intelligence” rather than to cognitive factors such as IQ or technical skill); 
accord Keld Jensen, Intelligence is Overrated: What You Really Need to Succeed, 
Forbes (Mar. 12, 2012),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2012/04/12/ 
intelligence-is-overrated-what-you-really-need-to-succeed/, (citing study attributing 
85% of managerial financial success to people skills rather than high IQ or technical 
knowledge). No less a figure than Frederick W. Taylor himself acknowledged in 
testimony to Congress that “there are many workman who are intellectually [able, 
presumably in emotional intelligence as well] . . .,  who have plenty of brains, who are 
just as capable of developing a science as those on the managing side.”  But Taylor 
cited another reason: “[The ‘workman’] has neither the time nor the money to do it.” 
Taylor, quoted in BRAVERMAN, supra note 38, at 115–16 (citation omitted). Taylor’s 
honesty is refreshing, but he neglected to mention that if the “workman” lacks the time 
and the money to use his brains to improve production, this is in part due to the 
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level positions in large firms and higher-level positions in small 
firms.’”131  “Elite control” thus helps achieve “economies of scale in 
information transmission.”132  Participatory management as it exists as a 
variety of practices and mechanisms that for the most part give workers 
no real authority, is an “adaption to economic changes,”133essentially 
serving as a one-way transmission belt for “gathering information from 
employees and efficiently transmitting it to appropriate decision 
makers.”134 
This is not fully persuasive.  It is little more than a repetition of 
well-known facts, many clearly stated by Bainbridge himself, about the 
traditional hierarchical organizational structure and the powerlessness of 
participatory management within it, ornamented based on an essentially 
unsupported and highly doubtful assertion that this system is the most 
reliable transmitter of correct information to the most qualified decision-
makers.  I discuss two possible responses. 
First, Bainbridge begs the question just as do Nozick, Lane, and 
Steele.  He assumes the decision-makers are the top and middle 
management, the agents of the owners.  In a genuine employee 
participation program that gave genuine decision-making power to the 
workers, however, whether at the operational or the strategic level, the 
decision-makers would be, or would include, the employees and their 
representatives. Further, Bainbridge admits that “[w]orkers still have 
more information than their supervisors about many aspects of 
production,”135 including how to increase personal productivity, the 
unique properties of technology, and in some cases how to restructure 
the workplace to enhance productivity, customer attitudes, and the 
                                                                                                                                      
implementation of the “science of management” developed by Taylor and other 
advocates of now-traditional hierarchical business organization. Things might well be 
different under a system of genuine employee participation. 
 131. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007 (quoting 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 6, at 52). See infra note 144 for 
discussion. 
 132. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007 n.147 (citing 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Scale Returns in Communication and the Elite Control of 
Organizations, 7 J. L. ECON & ORG.1 (1991)). 
 133. Id. at 1010; see supra Part I (discussing the rise of the new economy and the 
increasing role of knowledge work). 
 134. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 164. As Mike Parker, a 
union critic of actually existing employee participation programs, says, “Management 
wants access to workers’ knowledge about the work process.” PARKER, INSIDE THE 
CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 24. 
 135. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1010. 
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preferences of the workers themselves.136  If owners or managers have 
more information than workers about some aspects of production, as 
Taylor intended,”137 it is a result of conscious design instituted by Taylor 
and his followers to divest workers of their knowledge and invest it in 
management, not a natural fact or an inherent truth about the nature of 
organizations.138 That choice is what makes management “elite.”  If 
enterprises were organized so that employees had extensive say and real 
power, the responsible employees, not merely someone at the top of a 
large hierarchy, would be among the “right decision maker[s].” 
Further, traditional organizational structures increase transaction 
costs.  Systematically stripping employees of the skills and information 
they need and having them follow orders from above based on 
information derived originally from themselves is no obvious solution to 
the problems of getting the right information to the appropriate decision-
makers, even if it permits lower pay for less skilled labor.  Hierarchical 
enterprise organization that removes decision makers a level or more 
away from the people who have, or originally had, the relevant 
information, inevitably creates transactions cost inefficiencies in 
transmitting the information up and down the line, as well as in 
extracting the information from its original sources and then inculcating 
it in people not directly involved in generating or using that knowledge. 
It also virtually guarantees diminishing the accuracy and quality of the 
information through what is, in effect, a game of “telephone.”  For the 
hierarchical system to be more efficient than a participatory one, the 
efficiency gains from lower pay would have to be larger than the 
efficiency losses due to such transaction costs and degraded information 
by decision makers.  Bainbridge offers no argument that they would.  If 
such an argument or evidence indeed exists, I have been unable to find it 
despite diligent effort.  
Second, Bainbridge ignores epistemological problems about large 
bureaucratic organizations well known since they were articulated by 
the Austrian economists Mises139 and Hayek.140  An elite corps of 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 1010–11. 
 137. Id. at 1010. 
 138. As Taylor wrote, “All possible brain work should be removed from the shop 
and centered in planning or laying out department.” TAYLOR, SHOP MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 41. 
 139. See, e.g., Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth (S. Alder trans. 1990) (1920), in COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 
87 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed. 2009) (1935). 
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managers has to know too much about consumer demand and 
production requirements, available resources, feasible production 
techniques, and changes, actual and anticipated, in all of the above to 
make fully rational and informed decisions.141 While Mises and Hayek 
were criticizing central planning under Communism, their main points 
are generally applicable to any large bureaucratic organization. 
“Although Hayek himself was not explicit, most economists seem ready 
to identify the information-processing system of the firm as a variant of 
a ‘central’ planning system, i.e., hierarchy.”142  Clearly, the problems are 
not as severe in a single enterprise among many in a market economy as 
in Mises’s and Hayek’s target, where the centrally planned economy 
operates essentially as a single firm.  But the larger the enterprise the 
worse the problem.  The shipwreck of the U.S. auto industry provides a 
salutary warning,143 and undermines Bainbridge’s Panglossian notion 
that the hierarchical enterprise is a meritocracy that will sort out the 
“best and the brightest” and put the right people in the appropriate 
positions.144 
                                                                                                                                      
 140. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948) 
(collecting essays of the 1930s). For a good short summary of the Mises-Hayek theses 
(conventionally called the “calculation” problem), see also ARNOLD, CRITIQUE, supra 
note 54, at 246–63 (applied to Marx’s vision of communism as Arnold understands it). 
 141. It is odd that Bainbridge misses this point after saying that “decision makers 
can gather only so much information without being overloaded.”  Bainbridge, 
Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1005.  This point is a crucial premise in the 
Mises-Hayek calculation thesis. But it is an argument against reliance on hierarchical, 
top-down, centralized decision-making, rather than in favor of it. 
 142. Masahiko Aoki, The Motivational Role on an External Agent in the 
Informationally-Participatory Firm, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY 231, 233 (Samuel Bowles et. al., eds. 1993) (citing 
Christie J. Geankopolis & Paul R. Milgrom, A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited 
Managerial Attention, 5 J.  JAPANESE & INT’L ECONOMIES, 205 (1991) (discussing 
planning inefficiencies within particular firms due to the limit of manager’s 
information-processing capabilities)); see also David M. Wagner, Gonzalez v. Oregon: 
The Assisted Suicide of Chevron Deference, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 435, 451 (2007) 
(“In essence, Hayek argued that no assemblage of bureaucrats, no matter how large, 
smart, or well-trained, could know more about the market than the market itself.”) 
(discussing government regulators operating in a market society). 
 143. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING (1986) (describing the short-
sightedness and irrationality of the managers of the major American auto makers). 
 144. Also worth comment is the oddity of Williamson’s comment, endorsed by 
Bainbridge, supra notes 126 and 127, that the appropriate place for the “best,” however 
defined, is at the top of large organizations. There is evidence that small entrepreneurial 
firms are maybe more innovative than large corporate bureaucracies. See Azizah Y. Al-
Hibri, The American Corporation in the Twenty-First Century: Future Forms of 
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Ronald Coase’s theory would not help here. Coase was concerned 
with why firms exist at all rather the economy being just a network of 
bilateral contracts among individuals.145  He argued that the 
transactions costs of such contracting is often less efficient than a 
bureaucratic organization.146   Coase thought that firms arise roughly at 
the points where the transaction cost efficiencies of bureaucracy fall 
below those of contracting.  However, this idea, if correct, only 
explains why there are firm-market boundaries at all.  It does not 
illuminate whether the firm should be hierarchical or participatory. 
2. Shirking, Opportunism, and Monitoring 
Bainbridge’s second argument is that traditional hierarchical 
enterprise structure minimizes employee “shirking,”—the act of 
deliberately working at less than optimum productivity, and 
opportunistically allowing others to carry the burden.147  This is the 
concern that motivated Taylor,148 and involves a collective action or 
public goods problem. Where individual contribution is hard to measure, 
but the pay is the same however much or little the employee works, it is 
assumed that “the disutility of labor gives each team member an 
incentive to shirk because the individual’s reward is unlikely to be 
closely related to conscientiousness.”149  Hierarchy solves this by 
allowing “[m]anagement [to] meter[] the marginal productivity of each 
member and respond[] as necessary to prevent shirking.”150  
Diminishing shirking through monitoring is allegedly an efficiency gain 
of traditional organization. 
                                                                                                                                      
Corporate Governance, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1339, 1441 (1997); ZOLTAN J. ACS & 
DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 15 (TABLE 2.2) (1990) (showing 
that more than half of all innovations are made by firms of less than 500 employees, 
despite the research and development advantages accruing to larger firms). A system 
that sorted the more “capable and energetic” into the largest firms would arguably tend 
to limit rather than promote innovation. 
 145. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW 33 (1988) (reprinted from 4 ECONOMICA N.S. 386 (1937)). 
 146. Id. at 38–40. 
 147. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007. 
 148. See supra notes 42 and 136 and accompanying text (discussing Taylor on 
“soldiering”). 
 149. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007. 
 150. Id. at 1009. 
2013] VOICE WITHOUT SAY 993 
The monitoring explanation is just as defective and unsupported as 
the informational one.151 First, Bainbridge offers no evidence that the 
phenomenon of shirking is real and pervasive. He simply assumes that 
shirking is widespread because, he assumes that not working is a 
“value”152 and monetary reward is what really matters. His source for 
these platitudes is not any empirical evidence, but assumptions of 
economic theory.153 These are articles of faith for economists.154 But 
there is psychological evidence that these assumptions are false. 
Although the full story is complex,155 work, even wage labor in a market 
economy, that is not, in Nozick’s term, fully “meaningful and 
satisfying,” is often a comparatively positive utility.156 This preference is 
almost as widespread in working class as in professional jobs.157 Work is 
enjoyable, when it is, because of the satisfaction derived from feeling 
                                                          
 151. See Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1, Part III.B.1 (discussing Arnold’s monitoring 
argument, based on shirking concerns, against full labor management as opposed to 
mere, even if genuine, employee participation); N. Scott Arnold, Market Socialism, 6 
CRITICAL REV. 517, 536 (1993); N. SCOTT ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 
OF MARKET SOCIALISM: A CRITICAL STUDY (1994) [hereinafter ARNOLD, PHIL. & 
ECON.]. My argument there turned on the fact that the workers had equity interest in the 
enterprises, and therefore had an interest in mutual monitoring to protect their property. 
The empirical research supported that hypothesis. “Employee ownership also gives 
each employee an incentive to monitor his fellow employees and apply pressure on 
them not to shirk, an incentive largely lacking in an investor-owned firm.” HANSMANN, 
ENTERPRISE, supra note 60, at 70; see also GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: 
WORKER’S CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 183 (2003) (citing studies). That 
argument would therefore apply, here, to employee participation plans like ESOPs that 
give employees ownership rights or at least a claim to the residual income from the 
enterprise (gain-sharing), but not in any obvious way to ones that do not. 
 152. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1007. 
 153. Id. at 1008 (citing Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information 
Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), reprinted in 
ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK, supra note 2, at 73. 
 154. See, e.g., Bentham, who wrote that “[t]he desire for labor for the sake of labor . 
. . seems scarcely to have place in the human breast” (quoted in LANE, EXPERIENCE, 
supra note 22, at 370). 
 155. See, e.g., LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, Pts. V–VII; TIBOR SCITOVSKY, 
THE JOYLESS ECONOMY 134 (rev. ed. 1992). 
 156. NOZICK, supra  note 21, at 101; see also ROBERT LANE, THE LOSS OF 
HAPPINESS IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES (2000) 73–74 [hereinafter LANE, HAPPINESS] (In 
“what people actually enjoyed doing (not earning), work came before all leisure 
activities” except for playing with one’s children and socializing with one’s friends.); 
LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 472–73. 
 157. LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 472–73. 
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“competent and self-determining.”158 Above some variable minimum, 
people care more about how they are treated than what they get.159 
Workers, naturally, would prefer to be paid, because they must pay for 
food, shelter, and other goods; and up to a point would prefer more 
money to less.160 But it is well established that tying performance, 
especially in otherwise meaningful or satisfying work, to extrinsic 
rewards can encourage shirking.  “[P]aying people to do the work they 
enjoy not only detracts from that enjoyment, but reduces effort.”161 
Hierarchical monitoring, therefore, may actually be counterproductive, 
as a solution to shirking.  Giving employees actual authority (“say”) 
may contribute to the self-determination that makes work intrinsically 
valuable, and thereby discourage shirking. It might also decrease labor 
costs by reducing reliance on supervisory employees. 
Second, to the extent that shirking is a problem, Bainbridge not 
only fails to explain why participatory management is inferior to 
hierarchy as a way to deal with it, but actually offers evidence to the 
contrary. With most employee participation programs, self-monitoring 
by employees is a crucial part of the program.162 It operates by building 
“team spirit” and commitment to the group,163 encouraging identification 
with the company164 and boosting the participating worker’s desire to do 
a good job.165 Using the analogy of team sports, Bainbridge states that 
                                                          
 158. Id. at 369, 388–89. 
 159. Id. at 266 (discussing studies of attitudes towards the justice system). 
 160. The effect of increased wealth on happiness drops off sharply in accord with 
the law of diminishing marginal returns. See LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 527 
(arguing that for the poor “the effect of money on happiness. . . is substantial, . . . [but] 
[i]n the advanced countries, for about 85 percent of the population . . . it is true for the 
individual that money does not buy (much) happiness”). Social psychologists and 
political scientists call this “the minimal effect thesis.” Id.; see also LANE, EXPERIENCE, 
supra note 22, Ch. 26 (“Buying Happiness”) in general for extensive empirically based 
research and citations, and LANE, HAPPINESS, supra note 156, Ch. 4 (“Why Money 
Doesn’t Buy Happiness for Most of Us”). 
 161. LANE, EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 371 (citing many studies); see also, id. at 
371–74 nn. 34-47; ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD 
STARS, INCENTIVE PLANS, A’S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES (1999) (educational 
context). If work is less meaningful and satisfying, these results do not necessarily 
apply, and few people in a market society can afford to work for little or nothing. 
 162. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1024. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; see also PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 17, 19. 
 165. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1024, see also PARKER, 
INSIDE THE CIRCLE, supra note 17, at 9. 
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“team spirit is “a mechanism for discouraging shirking.”166 Participatory 
management, says Bainbridge, “tries to promote self-monitoring by 
inculcating management’s quality and productivity goals into 
workers.”167 Empirical research cited by Bainbridge indicates that these 
mechanisms work. “At least one case study shows that commitment to a 
work team increases productivity . . . . If generalizable this . . . finding 
confirms that self-monitoring is a powerful monitoring device.”168 
Peer pressure, moreover, “may substitute for managerial 
monitoring.”169 Bainbridge discusses a case study of a QC program in 
which “workers were given [largely illusory] responsibility for 
discipline decisions [about] their fellow employees.”170 This “proved an 
effective means of generating peer pressure for greater productivity.”171 
Self-directed work teams, some of which involve compensation based 
on group performance or allow the team to decide on the compensation 
of each member, “entail considerable potential for peer pressure,”172 and 
“preliminary data suggest that self-directed work teams add substantially 
to productivity.”173 Because Bainbridge agrees that “such programs have 
an important monitoring function,”174 one might expect an explanation 
of why hierarchical management is necessary, and, why, where it exists, 
employee participation that is largely empty and merely advisory, is a 
better way to reduce shirking than giving workers real say. None is 
                                                          
 166. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1025. One such form of 
employee participation, Total Quality Management (TQM) uses “social approval and 
recognition . . . as a mechanism for more effectively monitoring production workers,” 
id. at 1026. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (citing James Wallace Bishop & K. Dow Scott, How Commitment Affects 
Team Performance, HR MAGAZINE, Feb. 1997, at 107). See also Schwartz, Mill, supra 
note 1 at nn. 125–26 and accompanying text (providing more evidence for this 
phenomenon). 
 169. Id. at 1027. 
 170. Id. (citing GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS, QUALITY CIRCLES, 
AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 46–47 (1988)). 
 171. Id. (citing GRENIER, supra note 170, at 17). 
 172. Id. at 1030. 
 173. Id. at 1029 (citing JOHN L. COTTON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 181–83 (1993). 
A recent case study of 470 employees in a Croatian manufacturing firm by Jones and 
Goic showed that workers who participate in independent work teams “exert more 
effort (shirk less) and engage in more peer monitoring (or horizontal monitoring).” 
Derek C. Jones & Srecko Goic, Do Innovative Working Practices Foster Mutual 
Gains?: Evidence from Croatia,  in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS, 23, 41 (Tor Eriksson, ed. 2010). 
 174. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1031. 
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forthcoming except the observation that this is what most companies do, 
whether or not they have employee participation programs.175 Needless 
to say, that is not an explanation. It is the phenomenon to be explained. 
Third, Bainbridge makes no attempt to measure or compare the 
supposed costs of shirking with those of monitoring. Maintaining a 
highly articulated hierarchal bureaucratic system is not cheap. A 2010 
study by a management-consulting firm found that the median number 
of management levels in U.S. corporations surveyed ranged from seven 
in larger firms (10,000 or more employees) to three in smaller firms (1-
99 employees).176 Computer World’s 2011 online salary survey listed 
salaries for middle managers in the information and technology field as 
ranging from approximately $71,000 to $120,253 per year and 
averaging approximately $93,252.177  Simplyhired.com, a job search 
information website, stated that the average lower-end middle 
managerial salary was $59,000 per year.178 On the high end, Forbes.com 
reported that the CEOs of the 500 largest companies in the U.S. received 
$4 billion in 2009, which averages out to $8 million each. Disparities 
between the compensation of ordinary employees and high level 
executives have increased from enormous to jaw-dropping.179 
These expenses would probably be reduced and disparities of this 
sort would probably not occur if workers had a serious say in 
determining the management structure, including the number of 
managerial levels, and employee compensation, including their own and 
that of the managers.  Insofar as evidence from labor-managed, worker-
                                                          
 175. See id. at 1031–34. 
 176. Erik Samdahl, Middle Managers Spread Thin as Organizational Structure 
Flattens, 14CP, http://www.i4cp.com/productivity-blog/2010/09/23/middle-managers-
spread-thin-as-organizational-structure-flattens. 
 177. Salary Survey 2011 Middle Management, COMPUTERWORLD, 
http://www.computerworld.com/spring/salary-survey/2011/job_level/4 (total 
compensation). 
 178. Average Low-End Middle Manager Salaries, SIMPLY HIRED, 
http://www.simplyhired.com/a/salary/search/q-Low+End+Middle+Manager. 
 179. Scott DeCarlo, What the Boss Makes, FORBES.COM (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/compensation-chief-executive-salary-leadership-
boss-10-ceo-compensation-intro.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011). This was a 30% 
collective pay cut from 2008 (in the wake of the financial crisis) Id.  The ratio of 
compensation of the 100 highest paid CEOs in America to the average workers wage 
was 2,388:1 in 1998, up from 373:1 in 1988 and 49:1 in 1970. SAMUEL BOWLES, ET AL., 
UNDERSTANDING CAPITALISM: COMPETITION, COMMAND, AND CHANGE 350-51 Fig. 
14.3 (3d ed. 2005). 
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owned cooperatives is indicative, employees would prefer relatively 
minimal hierarchies and fairly flat pay scales.180 The fact that the 
experience of the cooperatives is to some degree applicable to capitalist 
ventures is underlined by the relatively decentralized character of the 
“Silicon Valley” firms, largely capital-managed and investor-owned 
enterprises that, according to one analyst, Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, “exhibit a 
distinctly egalitarian, decentralized management structure”181 that was 
pioneered by Hewlett-Packard and so is known as the “HP way.”182  To 
assess Bainbridge’s claim that genuine employee participation would be 
less efficient than traditional organization because it would lack the 
                                                          
 180. While evidence from fully labor-managed and -owned enterprise cannot be 
translated simply into predictions about what workers in capital-owned enterprises with 
genuine participatory management would prefer, it is relevant. For example, in the 
plywood cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest, America’s longest-lived and most 
successful cooperative experience, which at their height in the mid-1950s and early 
1960s encompassed around 27 plants, see GREENBERG, supra note 54, apart from the 
higher-paid general manager, the worker-owners “normally receive[d] equal pay,” 
DOW, supra note 151, at 53. The plywood cooperatives “use[d] significantly fewer 
supervisors than their conventional counterparts, . . . one or two per shift of 60 to70 
people as opposed to five to seven in conventional firms” CHRISTOPHER GUNN, 
WORKERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 111 (1984). 
  The most successful cooperative venture in the world, the Mondragon co-
operatives of Spain, has 42,000 employees, about 150 member coops, dozens of 
manufacturing firms, as well as service enterprises, a bank, and an international 
presence on five continents. DOW, supra note 151, at 58, 61, 64. Workers elect a 
Governing Council annually, id. at 59, which is responsible for appointing or hiring 
managers, id.at 59.There is a limited ratio, typically one to three between the lowest and 
highest wages, id. at 60 (after 1985, widened to one to six, id. at 63). “[T]here are few 
layers of bureaucracy intervening between co-op members and decision makers.”  ROY 
MORRISON, WE BUILD THE ROAD AS WE TRAVEL: MONDRAGON, A COOPERATIVE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM 80 (1991). 
  Obviously there are dangers of selection bias and unrepresentativeness in using 
these unusual institutions for benchmarks. However, with respect at least to the 
plywood coops, the workers ideologically and on other dimensions were not especially 
radical or idealistic. See GREENBERG, supra note 54, at 137–38 (noting that they tended 
to identify as middle-class rather than working-class and were more likely to identify 
themselves as Republicans than workers in conventional firms). 
 181. Al-Hibri, supra note 144, at 1405. 
 182. Id. at 1403. According to Bloomberg Businessweek, this was still true as 
recently as 2004. See Hewlett & Packard: Architects of the Info Age, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
04_13/b3876054.htm (“The founding fathers of Silicon Valley steered tech away from 
hierarchy.”).This may not be appropriate for all firms, and even Al-Hibri, an enthusiast 
for this business model, does not dispute “large hierarchical/vertical firms . . . continue 
[] to have a role in today’s corporate landscape.” Al-Hibri, supra note 144, at 1440–41. 
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hierarchy necessary to minimize shirking, we would require some 
plausible estimate of the relative costs of shirking and hierarchy. 
Bainbridge offers no data about the costs of shirking, which may be less 
than he supposes if the “HP way” is at all representative.  In addition, 
Bainbridge does not even consider the very substantial direct monetary 
costs of hierarchy that I have indicated here.  Without comparison we 
cannot tell whether Bainbridge’s thesis has any empirical basis. What 
empirical evidence that he does provide suggests that the thesis is 
erroneous. Finally, the question arises: how do traditional firms ensure 
that managers themselves do not shirk their duties to reduce shirking by 
lower level employees? “Quis custodiet ipsos custotodes?” - Who 
watches the watchers?183  Bainbridge’s answer is that it is ultimately the 
shareholders represented by the board of directors that monitors the 
managers.184  This puts a great deal of faith—misplaced, as I have 
argued elsewhere185—in the efficacy of the board of directors.  This is 
particularly striking in view of Bainbridge’s own recognition, indeed 
advocacy, of the fact that “shareholder voting has [and should have] 
very little to do with corporate decision making . . . .  The vast majority 
of corporate decisions . . . are made by the board of directors acting 
alone, or by managers to whom the board has properly delegated 
authority.”186  However, this raises a core insight of public choice 
theory: unless the incentives align the interests of the shareholding 
principals and their representative agents on the board and in 
management—the latter are themselves typically merely employees 
themselves—rent-seeking by agents at the principals’ expense is 
virtually inevitable, including shirking and other forms of opportunism 
by the intended monitors, and shirking their responsibilities to prevent 
shirking by their subordinates.187  Meanwhile board members, 
                                                          
 183. DECIMUS JUNIUS JUVENAL, SATIRES, Bk. VI, 11. 347–48, in JUVENAL AND PERSIUS 
110  (G.G.  Ramsay  ed. &  trans., Loeb Classical Library. 1940. rev. ed., Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1965). 
 184. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1055–75. 
 185. See Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1,  Part III.B.1, especially notes 133-34, 139–
53, and accompanying text (discussing a similar thesis in ARNOLD, PHIL. AND ECON., 
supra note 151, at 136–53) (referencing Bainbridge). 
 186. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601, 603 (2006). 
 187. See supra notes 176–86 and accompanying text. Far from being responsible 
agents with the interest of the shareholders at heart, managers and board members too 
frequently “siphon pure profits from the residual claimant and quasi-rents from the . . . 
hapless capital provider into [their] own pocket[s] . . . . e.g., in the form of inflated 
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handsomely remunerated regardless of their performance, typically lack 
the equity-holder’s interest in ensuring that management does its job. 
Why suppose that a hierarchical board and management will in general 
be more, or as, effective at monitoring employees as their fellow 
employees on the same level? It may be true up to a point that the 
market monitors the board and the top management, and weeds out 
poorly managed firms. However, if all firms are more or less equally 
poorly managed, shirking, if it is as great as a problem as Bainbridge 
assumes, will remain pervasive at all levels, and perhaps be worse at the 
higher levels where the monitors are insulated from the cost of their own 
opportunistic failures. No firm will have a significant competitive 
advantage with regard to organizational efficiency if all are operated a 
roughly similarly suboptimum level. 
 
C. THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING: EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
ENHANCES EFFICIENCY 
 
It is now time to make good on the claim that the participation is 
more efficient than authoritarianism, especially when the company gives 
its employees more power and authority. Bainbridge himself finds the 
data he considers “mixed,” ”inconclusive,”188and in fact, “damning.”189 
The theory he offers is, we have seen, unpersuasive.  And the situation 
with the data is also very different from what Bainbridge suggests. 
The evidence for the positive effects of employee participation on 
firm performance is so overwhelming that it would be easy to indulge in 
overkill; I limit myself to a reasonably representative sample.190 The 
                                                                                                                                      
salaries, perks, and other forms of on-the-job consumption,” ARNOLD, PHIL. AND ECON., 
supra note 151, at 141, while insulating themselves from the costs of their own 
parasitism and failures with “golden parachutes.” See, e.g. William J. Carney, 
Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An 
Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 418–23 (1988). For public choice theory 
generally, see supra notes 15 and 16. 
 188. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 677–78. But see his 
own admissions about the productivity-enhancing effects of Quality Circles and self-
directed Work Teams, supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 189. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 678. 
 190. Insofar as evidence from fully labor-managed and worker owned cooperatives 
is relevant, the basic result, no less robust than the results for employee participation, is 
summed up in DOW, supra note 151, at 240 (Labor-managed firms “have no evident 
problem with labor productivity. . . . [T]he direct comparisons with capital managed 
firms are favorable to labor managed firms.”). See Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1, at Part 
II.B.1, for discussion. 
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basic results are summed up in a meta-analysis of an examination of 
forty-six studies by labor researchers David Levine and Laura Tyson 
where, “participation usually leads to small, short run improvements in 
performance and sometimes leads to significant long-lasting 
improvements . . . . There is. . .  almost never a negative effect.”191 
Twenty six studies of ESOPs surveyed by Joseph Blasi suggest that 
“worker involvement in management combined with employee 
ownership, in which a high proportion of workers participate, may 
contribute to better economic performance . . . . There is no evidence 
that employee ownership hurts companies.”192 Productivity is most 
enhanced when participation is combined with profit sharing, narrow 
wage differentials, job security, and greater employee rights, such as 
dismissal only for cause.193 
A Columbia Business School study of 495 firms found that 
production workers in those firms with the most employee participation 
and profit sharing were 19% more productive than those with the 
least.194 An analysis of the literature on the productivity effects of 
employee involvement by Jacques Belanger for the Canadian 
government in 2000 stated that “a considerable body of research 
indicates that new work systems have a positive impact on productivity 
and firm performance. The most accurate calculations show productivity 
increases on the order of 6-7%.  This is already considerable.”195 
                                                          
 191. David Levine & Laura Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm’s 
Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 203–04 (Alan 
Blinder ed.1990); see also Martin L. Weitzmann & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing 
and Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE, supra, at 
96 (cited in Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 703 n.280). 
 192. BLASI, supra note 60, at 229, 231, and Appendix D, id. 267–73. See supra note 
60 (Most ESOPs lack employee participation). 
 193. BLASI, supra note 60, at 229. 
 194. Daniel Mitchell, et al., Alternative Pay Systems, Firm Performance, and 
Productivity, 165 Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA (1989), Table 8. Other studies 
found less dramatic but still positive effects. A study based on U.S. data found that 
profit sharing raises labor productivity by 3–5%. See DOUGLAS KRUSE, PROFIT 
SHARING: DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE? (1993) (cited in DOW, supra note 151, at 181). 
The average estimated productivity difference between ESOP and non-ESOP firms was 
6.2% and the average productivity increase after adoption of an ESOP was 4.4%. See 
DOW, supra note 151, at 182. In a reasonably completive market, those should be 
decisive advantages. 
 195. Jacques Belanger, The Influence of Employee Involvement on Productivity: A 
Review of Research, Applied Research Branch, Human Resources Development 
Canada, at 9, http://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.html?url=http:// 
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Freeman and Rogers state that, as a “broad summary” of “several 
studies,” programs ranging from formal EI to employee ownership are 
correlated with productivity increases of 2 to 5%, greater than the 
prevailing annual U.S. productivity growth rate of 1.5%.196  Elke Wolf 
and Thomas Zwick, based on a sample of between about 10,000 to 
almost 19,000 German establishments over the years 1999-2003,197 
found similar results to Freeman and Rogers, with their econometric 
analysis leading to the conclusion that “employee involvement seems to 
foster productivity.”198 Their measured effect is “weak,”199 but Wolf and 
Zwick themselves say that their results “strongly suggest that their own 
methodology “tend[s] to underestimate the productivity impact of 
employee involvement,”200 because they counted only direct and not 
spillover effects. The actual effects, including spillovers, are much 
greater.  Nonetheless, we may take it as solid a result as any in social 
science that (1) employee involvement enhances productivity and other 
measures of enterprise performance more than hierarchy does, and (2) 
that the more actual say and, in most studies, pay due to their 
involvement,201 that the employees receive, the stronger the result. 
Even if all that this evidence showed is that participation produced 
modest improvements in productivity,202 that would be enough to give 
                                                                                                                                      
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/MP32-29-00-4E.pdf. 
 196. Id. at 34. Belanger observes that “it is unclear how they came to this figure.” 
Id.; see also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 4, at 105–06. 
 197. Elke Wolf & Thomas Zwick, Reassessing the Productivity impact of Employee 
Involvement and Financial Incentives, 60 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 160, 165 (2008), 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/sbr/abstra/v60y2008i2p160-181.html.  Jones and Koto obtained 
similar results in their case study of 225 workers in offline teams in a light 
manufacturing firm. Jones & Koto, The Impact of Teams, supra note 8, at 216–17, with 
efficiency gains, including output (productivity), quality, and downtime, of about 3%, 
id.at 236. They note studies that other of firms using online teams studies produce 
larger results (14%), but theorize that the difference is due to the fact that their 
methodology captures only the “direct impact on . . . productivity,” id. at 236–37, and 
not the “possible. . . spillover effects, such as the teams solving various productivity 
problems (and thus enhancing the overall efficiency of the workplace),” id. at 237. 
 198. Wolf & Zwick, supra note 197, at 173. 
 199. Id.; see also id. at 174 Table 2. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Wolf and Zwick found no positive results from monetary incentives. Wolf & 
Zwick, supra note 197, at 176, 174 Table 2. This is an unusual result but, insofar as the 
work in question may be relatively meaningful and satisfying, is somewhat consistent 
with Lane, supra notes 149–58 and accompanying text. 
 202. And productivity improvements ranging from 19% at the high end to 2–5% at 
the low end are not trivial. 
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participation the “evolutionary” advantage necessary for Alchian’s 
efficiency selection argument to work.203 Insofar as purported 
diminished productive efficiency, overall utility, or transactions costs 
due to information flow or control for shirking have a central role in 
explaining the rarity of genuine employee participation and the 
dominance of traditional organizational structure, something has gone 
wrong with the inefficiency explanations we have considered. To simply 
infer inefficiency from rarity, as do Nozick, Lane, and Steele, is 
question-begging as well as unsubstantiated. To the extent that any 
mechanisms are offered, such as Bainbridge’s transactions cost 
explanations, the ones we have considered are fallacious for the reasons 
I have explained. Even if they were not, they would be explanations of a 
non-phenomenon. Employee participation is not inefficient. 
 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER 
CALLS THE TUNE 
A. WHY DOESN’T EVERY FIRM DO IT IF IT’S MORE PRODUCTIVE? 
If organizational structure is determined by profit-seeking 
capitalists or corporate managers acting on behalf of boards that want to 
make money for their investors, why do they not prefer more 
participatory structures if these would help, or at least not harm, 
productivity, as the first horn of Nozick’s trilemma suggests?204 
Freeman and Rogers ask the same question with respect to their more 
restricted notion of EI,205 “Why doesn’t every firm do it?”  Their terse 
answer is that EI “is not easy to implement,”206 because it calls for 
changes in the way both workers and managers look at their jobs.207 
                                                          
 203. See Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3.  On the other hand, if like Steele, one 
were to grant the enhanced productivity effect for the firm but say (at least arguendo) 
that for some reason there were overall efficiency or social welfare losses to consumers 
or society at large that offsets the gains to the firm, see STEELE, supra note 23, at 333, it 
would be important to explain what these losses were and by what mechanism they 
occurred, as Steele does not. Productivity gains and enhanced worker satisfaction looks 
like a positive-sum, win-win result all around. The burden is on the critic to explainwhy 
they are not, or why they are not mutually compatible. 
 204. See NOZICK, supra note 21, at 248. 
 205. As shown above, such programs are correlated with productivity increases of 2 
to 19%. See supra Part II.C. 
 206. Id. at 107. 
 207. Id. 
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There is much plausibility in this assessment as far as it goes. Scott 
Arnold has suggested to me208 that capitalists and their managers would 
resist ceding participatory rights because they might fear a slippery 
slope: the more rights granted to workers, the greater the risk, from their 
point of view, that de facto residual control rights—here meaning ones 
that cannot be specified in advance209—might weaken capital control 
over the firm. Marx210 and Schweickart211 would approve of this 
response, though not in ways that Arnold would like.212  As with 
Freeman and Rogers’ explanation, I think that Arnold has a point, but it 
requires development and modification. 
A deeper structural reason for the paucity of participation that goes 
beyond psychological inertia or fears of a slippery slope leading to loss 
of control has to do with the distribution of costs and benefits derived 
from the structure of ownership of the capital-owned firm. What 
Hansmann calls “the ownership of the enterprise,” in the sense of legal 
title to its assets and claim to residual income rights, matters to the 
management of the enterprise and its organizational form. Ownership 
creates material, structural incentives that reinforce psychological 
obstacles to implementing participation. Despite the productivity, 
efficiency and even possible social welfare gains of genuine employee 
participation, it is not in the interests of the owners and managers of the 
capital-owned firm. 
No single-factor explanation will be adequate, but I argue that a 
major part of the answer to the question, “Why doesn’t every firm do 
it?” lies in the ambiguity of the notions of efficiency and productivity in 
the context of ownership of the capital-owned firm.  It might be thought, 
on Alchian’s Darwinian selection theory, that any path to profit is good 
from a market point of view, and the more efficient the path and the 
more productive the process, the better. But if we examine the effects of 
the structure of capital ownership and how the costs and benefits of 
                                                          
 208. N. Scott Arnold, Sometime Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, personal correspondence (n.d., on file with author). 
 209. See Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986). 
 210. Marx thought that capitalists as such, that is, in their capacity as mere private 
owners of productive assets, were superfluous, essentially unnecessary for productive 
activity.  See 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 511 (trans. 
David Fernbach, Vintage 1981) (1894). I take no position on this claim in this Article. 
 211. Schweickart, making essentially the same point, argues that “providing capital 
is not a productive activity.” SCHWEICKART, supra note 27, at 11. 
 212. See supra note 54 (remarking on Arnold’s quasi-libertarianism). 
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different paths to profit differentially affect the differently situated 
participants in the productive process, we will see that this is not true 
from all points of view.  
First, however, we need some definitions and a few 
noncontroversial causal statements. Efficiency, understood 
commonsensically, means producing greater benefits for lower costs. 
But costs and benefits for whom? The rain falleth on the just and unjust 
alike,213 but costs and benefits are not so indiscriminate.  Costs and 
benefits are highly sensitive to relations of power and ownership.  
Market efficiency can mean simply maximizing social welfare or 
utility.214  It can also mean Pareto optimality that is, making everyone 
better off without making anyone worse off. 215 It can even mean 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (wealth maximization), in which the winners 
gain enough so they could, but do not, compensate the losers.216  
Efficiency of some sort is supposed to be approximated by the “invisible 
hand” operation of free competitive markets.217 Capitalists have an 
interest in economic efficiency, minimizing their factor (labor, capital, 
materials) costs per unit output,218 because this increases their profits.219 
                                                          
 213. Matt 5:45 (King James). 
 214. See STEELE, supra note 23, at 333. See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying 
text for discussion of the explanatory value of utility in this context, as well as the 
textual discussion in Part III.A. 
 215. See Coleman, supra note 106, at 97–98. More weakly, it can mean Pareto 
superiority, when a particular outcome is closer to Pareto optimality than another. 
 216. Id. at 98. 
 217. The general equilibrium theorems of neoclassical economics are that 
competitive markets which meet certain idealized conditions will produce Pareto 
optimal outcomes and that every Pareto efficient outcome can be supported by some set 
of prices. See Lionel W. MacKenzie, General Equilibrium, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 498 (1987).  But, since in the real world the idealized 
conditions necessary for the validity of the theorems—perfect information, perfect 
competition, no transaction costs, no externalities—cannot be met, real world markets 
can only hope to approximate Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks optimality. Apart from isolated 
outposts that may approximate these conditions, or some of them, they do not exist in 
actual markets. See Joan Robinson, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933); 
see also HAYEK, supra note 140. 
 218. THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 497 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter 
OED]. 
 219. As Alchian argues, we need not assume that capitalists and managers are 
profit-maximizers, motivated by a desire to increase profits above all as long as they 
behave as if they were. See Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
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Profit may be defined as net return on investment.220  Enhancing 
productivity, increasing output per unit input,221 including, centrally, 
labor input or labor productivity, measured in terms of work hours or 
number of employees, e.g., by implementing technological innovations 
or reorganizing production,222 is one way to increase economic 
efficiency, thus profits. Productivity, as observed, is widely used as a 
proxy for profitability. Direct comparison of profitability between 
traditional and participatory management employee participation is 
scanty, but the evidence that exists suggests the results one would 
expect, that more productive firms are also more profitable,223 and there 
is some evidence that more participatory forms are more profitable 
overall.224 With this in hand we can start to explain why a more 
productive and profitable organizational form is not more pervasive 
even within the limits of the capital-managed firm. 
 
                                                          
 220. Dow offers the more precise and technical definition of “total revenue minus 
total opportunity costs (explicit and implicit) of all members of the coalition 
constituting the firm.” DOW, supra note 151, at 109. He distinguishes this from 
“economic profit,” not subtracting payments to capital suppliers such as dividends and 
interest. Id. at 110. However, these notions are hard to operationalize and measure, even 
more than the more crude approximate definition I use here, which is difficult enough, 
and I am unaware of economic studies based on empirical data using the more 
theoretically rigorous definitions. There are few enough using something like the 
approximation used here. 
 221. OED, supra note 218, at 147; BLASI, supra note 60, at 225; see also Marglin, 
supra note 14 at 94. Marglin here speaks in the context of “[d]isciplining the worker,” 
id. As we have seen, this is one but not necessarily the most effective way to attempt to 
enhance productivity.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 222. BLASI, supra note 60, at 225. As Blasi observes, an increase in labor 
productivity “is not necessarily due to the workers. It may stem from an improvement 
in capital stock, management, or technical aspects of production.” Id. 
 223. See Giulio Bottazzi, et. al., Productivity, Profitability and Financial 
Performance, 17 INDUS & CORP. CHANGE 711, 744 (2008) (“[P]roductivity and 
profitability are linked by a significant and positive correlation . . . .”). 
 224. See MICHAEL CONTE & ARNOLD TANNENBAUM, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1980). 
Conte and Tannenbaum’s work is based on data from 1976. A follow-up study based on 
data from 1977–82, found no difference in performance between traditional and 
employee-owned firms in 1977–82, and suggested that the earlier study may have been 
biased by better economic times. COREY ROSEN, ET AL., EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN 
AMERICA: THE EQUITY SOLUTION 51–52 (1986) (citing Arnold Tannenbaum, et al., 
Research Report: The Relationship of Employee Ownership to the Technological 
Adaptiveness and Performance of Companies 1–2 (University of Michigan Survey 
Research Center (1984)). The employee-owned forms in the later study were more 
inclined to accept lower profits in harder times. Id. 
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B. MARGLIN ON THE RISE OF THE FACTORY SYSTEM: PROFITABILITY 
FOR WHOM? 
 
Arnold’s hypothesis of the threat of a slippery slope may be filled 
out with the analysis provided by Stephen Marglin in a classic article 
explaining the rise of traditional organization or the “factory system,” as 
it developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.225 
Participation may indeed promote profit by enhancing productivity, but 
the higher the degree of participation, the less the ability of capital 
management to increase economic efficiency in other ways, by reducing 
wages, substituting less skilled and cheaper labor, cutting the workforce, 
or getting more work per work hour by speedup, intensified discipline, 
and closer and more intrusive supervision. There is no reason to think 
that these traditional methods are more productive than participatory 
management; the weight of the evidence, as we have seen, is to the 
contrary, and there is some evidence that they may be less, or, at any 
rate, no more, profitable.226 However they have the decisive advantage, 
from the point of view of owners and management, that they leave 
control of the distributions of gains and losses in the hands of owners 
and management, who may accordingly arrange matters to their liking. 
Public choice theory predicts that they will use their control to extract 
rents from the firm even at the cost of greater overall profitability or 
enhanced productivity. 
Marglin directly faces the “survivalist” argument that “the factory 
survived, therefore it must have been a less costly method of production 
than alternatives.”227 Alchian’s own version of the argument228 is too 
                                                          
 225. Marglin, supra note 14. 
 226. See supra notes 106 (discussing productivity as a proxy for profitability) and 
223 (stating Bottazzi’s result that profitability is positively correlated with 
productivity). 
 227. Marglin, supra note 14, at 83. Traditional capital management has diverse 
forms, and has evolved in various ways since Andrew Ure, one of the earliest 
prominent theorists and advocates of “the factory system,” expounded the methods 
pioneered by the English textile manufacturer Richard Arkwright. See ANDREW 
URE,THE PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURES 15–16 (Frank Kass & Co. Ltd. 1835) (stating 
that Arkwright’s main achievement was not so much in devising novel production 
techniques as in  “devis[ing] and administer[ing] a successful code of factory discipline 
. . . required . . . to subdue the refractory tempers of work-people accustomed to 
irregular paroxysms of diligence”).  Adam Smith had famously discussed a piece of the 
system – the division of labor in manufacture, specifically, of pins—The Wealth of 
Nations. See SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 121. However, the full factory 
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abstract and insensitive to crucial features of the competitive 
environment, in particular the divergences in interest and differentials in 
power between labor and capital. The hallmark of traditional capital 
management is “supervision and discipline.”229 Marglin’s thesis, put 
briefly, is that these are not necessary for increased productivity or 
profitability, but they do serve the function of giving capitalists two 
things: (1) a role in production that they otherwise would lack,230 and (2) 
a larger share of the resulting profits at the expense of labor.231  The first 
thesis, that capitalists are unnecessary to production, is, to say the least, 
highly contentious. This point is not necessary to the specific issue 
under consideration in this Article, which is why capital-owned firms 
                                                                                                                                      
system as developed by Arkwright and others and discussed by Ure and Marx 
(respectively its contemporary main advocate and critic) was not, as Ure states, in place 
for at least another thirty or so years. URE, supra, at 16 (quoted in Marglin, supra note 
14, at 85). 
  The system was later further articulated by Taylor’s “scientific management,” 
see Taylor, supra notes 38–39 (developing Ure’s sort of insights and applying them 
across any sort of employment) [needs a pincite]; BRAVERMAN, supra note 38 at 305–
15 (describing the early extension of Taylorism to office work). But cf. LANE, 
EXPERIENCE, note 22, at 289 (arguing that the work in traditional organization is not 
necessarily degrading), to the more recent interest in at least quasi-participatory 
management forms discussed supra notes 58–73 and accompanying text. 
  However, the hierarchical, segmented, and autocratic features of capital 
management remain more or less a constant through all the transformations, including 
most of the capital-managed experiments in participation. See Bainbridge, Participatory 
Management, supra note 4, at 688. “The essence of the factory is discipline,” writes the 
economic historian David S. Landes, “the opportunity it affords for the direction and 
coordination of labor.” THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 14 (David S. Landes ed. 1966). 
 228. Marglin does not specifically cite Alchian, but his target is the Darwinian 
explanation of survival of an organizational form because of purportedly superior 
efficiency, which is essentially Alchian’s thesis. Marglin specifically attacks a 
neoclassical version of the argument based on an assumption of perfect competition, 
Marglin, supra note 14, at 65–66, an assumption that Alchian does not share—for one, 
he rejects profit-maximization, but Marglin’s argument carries over to transactions cost 
theses like Alchian’s that do not share neoclassical assumptions. 
 229. Marglin, supra note 14, at 94. 
 230. Id. at 62 (stating that traditional organization “guarantees the entrepreneur an 
essential role in the production process); id. at 71 (stating that “the capitalist had no 
essential role to play in the production process”). Marglin qualifies such claims by 
stating that “this is not to say that [capital providers] . . . never contributed anything of 
technological  importance to the production process.” Id. at 71 n.11. Arkwright, for 
example, was a  practical inventor as well as an organizational innovator. Id. at 82 
(referring to Arkwright’s invention of the water frame to replace the spinning jenny in 
textile mills). 
 231. Id. at 62. 
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are not more or genuinely participatory.232 I take no position on the first 
thesis here. I might even concede it for the sake of argument, but here 
set it aside.  The second thesis, that traditional management is about the 
distribution or appropriation of profit, about who gets what, and not 
about absolute increase in productivity or profitability, is at the core of 
my explanation of the puzzle I address here. 
As Marglin frames his argument, the case for the superiority of 
traditional management turns on a conflation of what he calls 
technological superiority or efficiency, a matter of “produc[ing] more 
output with the same inputs”233—in my terms, productivity—with what 
he calls “economic superiority or efficiency,”234 He does not explicitly 
define this latter term but links it to the methodological idealization of 
the perfectly competitive market, and therefore it should probably be 
understood as one of the sorts of what I call “market” efficiency: utility 
maximization, Pareto optimality, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.235 He 
properly insists on a sharp distinction between technological efficiency 
(and, impliedly, economic or market efficiency) as opposed to the mere 
production of “more output for more input,”236 whether of time, effort, 
or intensity of, e.g., labor.237 Using more to make more is in no sense a 
form of efficiency. Marglin contends that an organizational form or 
method can be adopted without being technologically superior, if, 
essentially it provides more benefit to those with greater power—the 
owners or managers of the capitalist firm.238 “Innovation . . . depends on 
who is in control and under what constraints that control is exercised.”239 
                                                          
 232. The controversial thesis is at issue in the companion piece to this Article, 
Schwartz, Mill, supra note 1.  The basic question posed in that Article presupposes that 
a labor-managed market economy where workers own and manage enterprises without 
capitalists might well be feasible. I do not argue for this proposition here. For an 
excellent survey of direct arguments in support of it, see SCHWEICKART, supra note 27, 
at 1–47. 
 233. Marglin, supra note 14, at 64. 
 234. Id. at 65. 
 235. See supra note 15. I have reserved the term “economic efficiency” for 
reduction of factor costs per unit output, supra note 218 and accompanying text, an 
important concept that is absent from Marglin’s argument, and includes “market 
efficiency,” the cluster of concepts including Pareto optimality or superiority, Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, and utility maximization. See supra notes 213–22. 
 236. Marglin, supra note 14, at 64. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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In particular, authoritarian hierarchical methods “could and did reduce 
costs without being technologically superior.”240 The discipline and 
supervision involved in the (now) traditional hierarchical firm 
organization “had nothing to do with [technical] efficiency [i.e., 
productivity], at least as this term is understood by economists . . . 
[because it] meant a larger output in return for a greater input of labor, 
not more output for the same input.”241 As we have seen, the adoption of 
less efficient systems that benefit the decision makers is consistent with 
public choice theoretic predictions about rent-seeking.242 
This formulation involves two important assumptions that Marglin 
never makes explicit. The first is the obvious claim I have discussed, 
that managerial and supervisory labor is costly.243  The second, more 
controversial claim, is that the sort of efficiency relevant to 
understanding and assessing the origin and persistence of traditional 
organizational forms, the appropriate target of a critique of an 
efficiency-based explanation, is technical efficiency, i.e., productivity, 
and not one of the other sorts of efficiency mentioned above. 
Marglin never directly considers the possibility that an 
organizational form might be superior with respect to technical 
efficiency but inferior with respect to another sort of efficiency. This is 
an omission, but it is harmless. Marglin properly rejects that Pareto 
optimality or superiority—whatever its normative value for assessing an 
economic or social outcome—as linked to false assumptions about 
perfect competition. Independently, Pareto efficiencies are unlikely to 
motivate any decision maker or be the object rather than the effect (if 
that) of market selection. Marglin might reasonably set them aside. 
Likewise, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency may provide some basis for 
normative assessment of alternatives, but has no obvious positive 
explanatory value in predicting behavior, because it is not clear why any 
actual economic actor would care about the merely hypothetical 
                                                          
 240. Id. at 84 (emphasis in original). 
 241. Id. at 94–95. 
 242. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (citing public choice literature and 
doctrine on rent seeking). 
 243. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. The closest that Marglin comes to 
discussing the cost of management is to remark that the need for discipline and 
supervision other than that provided by the market indicate deviations from the 
neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition. Marglin, supra note 14, at 64–65. I 
discuss this point more extensively in a related context, also concerning the explanation 
of hierarchy in capitalist enterprise in Justin Schwartz, In Defence of Exploitation, 11 
PHIL & ECON. 275, 288–92 (1995). 
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possibility of making or receiving compensation for losses that is not 
actually paid, nor is it evident how this sort of efficiency could be the 
object, rather than the effect of market selection. Utility maximization or 
improvement in overall social welfare extending more widely than the 
workplace suffers from the same explanatory problems. 
At the crux of the matter is the assumption that if employees have 
any significant say in the matter, they are likely, ceteris paribus, to 
prefer nonhierarchical methods that also enhance productivity and at 
least do not harm profitability to traditional organization. This is 
because, as Nozick, Lane, Steele, and Marx suggest, traditional methods 
impose costs on workers in the form of less freedom to determine their 
own activities at work, pressure for longer hours, more intense and 
exhausting, more segmented, mechanical, and repetitive work, less job 
security and, in many cases, lower compensation.244 Indeed, this was the 
very point of Taylorism.245  As Arnold hints with his “slippery slope” 
concern, the greater and more meaningful employee participation, the 
more say employees would have, and the less say there would be for the 
owners and managers.246 
The point is not an abstract one about who is in charge. Rather, it is 
about how who is in control affects substantive decision-making. Who is 
in charge, or gets a real say, affects what the firm does. The owners of 
capital-managed firms benefit by traditional hierarchical measures, and 
so implement, directly or through managerial agents, these authoritarian 
methods and make the more familiar sorts of choices about both 
enterprise organization and firm policy. Where they allow worker 
participation at all, they limit it to a largely advisory role while retaining 
ultimate decision-making authority that offers greater scope for rent-
seeking. If workers had a significant measure of real power to decide 
about enterprise concerns that was beyond the mere pro forma right to 
offer suggestions for management approval while real control remained 
in the hands of capital, they would most likely make significantly 
different sorts of choices about many important matters than owners and 
managers make in traditional firms.247 This is indicated by the very 
                                                          
 244. See supra notes 21–23 (Nozick, Lane, and Steele); 38–42, 102–08 and 
accompanying text (citing Taylor’s explanation of his goals in the context of 
Braverman’s and Bainbridge’s discussion of Taylorism). 
 245. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how deskilling lowers 
labor costs). 
 246. See supra notes 208–12 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 180 and infra notes 248–49. 
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different modes of operation of labor-managed and capital-managed 
firms.248 Public choice theory predicts that this would reduce rent 
seeking by owners and managers. Opportunistic behavior by workers 
would remain an issue, but the empirical data we have discussed in Part 
II.C suggests that, to the extent that it occurred, it would not harm 
productivity. 
The reason for this turns on considerations of ownership and 
control, the fact that legal claim to residual income—control over 
profits—lies, virtually by definition, with the ownership of the 
enterprise. The result is that, as Schweickart puts it, “[t]he costs and 
gains fall systematically on different persons, with those bearing the 
financial risk having the decisive power.”249 This formulation, while 
profoundly right at the bottom, is slightly misleading in expression. 
                                                          
 248. Data from labor-managed firms, although applicable only with care and 
qualification to capital-managed firms, is relevant and suggestive, because the policies 
management typically chooses in traditional firms appear on the whole to be less 
beneficial to employees than those workers choose when they actually exercise control. 
Labor-managed firms do tend to embody many democratic and employee-friendly 
features: employment security, egalitarian pay scales, genuine participation with 
managerial authority in all aspects of firm policy, transparency as to finances, and 
democratic control of the enterprise. See infra. One might reasonably expect any 
employees in any sort of firm to find such policies attractive. 
  For example, the American Pacific Coast plywood cooperatives and the 
Spanish Mondragon cooperatives, discussed supra note 180 and accompanying text, 
offered relatively flat hierarchies, highly egalitarian pay, and considerable job security. 
The plywood cooperatives guaranteed member employees a job at whatever the coop 
was paying. DOW, supra note 151, at 54. Although in theory members could be fired, 
and in most plants one or two actually had been, “the ability of the organization to 
discharge an [employee] owner is severely restricted.” Id. at 55. With Mondragon, there 
had been no layoffs in any coop prior to 1983, id.at 62, and after that, only 30 of (then) 
18,000 members had to take advantage of Mondragon’s internal unemployment 
insurance. Id. 
  Democratic control and transparency were real. In the plywood coops, the 
directors were currently employed owner-workers and members had, and routinely 
exercised, a right to examine any firm data or documents they wished. Id. at 54. “In 
general the coops exhibit[ed] a robust form of organizational democracy where 
representative institutions are reinforced by rather wide-spread participation on part of 
individual workers.” Id. (citing GREENBERG, supra note 54). In the less directly 
democratic Mondragon co-operatives, workers elect a Governing Council annually who 
are, responsible for appointing or hiring managers, id. at 58–59. Organizational changes 
giving more authority to top management and increased use of hired labor have created 
debates about to what extent Mondragon remained democratic, but Mondragon has 
“retained democratic internal structures at the level of the individual coops.” Id. at 64. 
 249. SCHWEICKART, supra note 27, at 231. 
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Workers too bear financial risk –unemployment, if the enterprise fails; 
loss of equity, if they have a stake in the firm through stock ownership, 
perhaps in the form of an ESOP share or a pension plan. Therefore it 
might be more appropriate to say that in traditionally-structured 
enterprises the costs to workers due to hierarchical organization are not 
costs to the owners and managers who determine the structure of the 
firm. 
Of course, as observed in Part II.B.2, traditional organization is 
costly to capitalist owners in monetary terms.250 With regard to direct 
costs, it involves hiring many more or less highly compensated 
employees, whose value to the firm, at least in such numbers and at such 
costs, is questionable. At the very least this sort of organization is not 
superior in providing the benefits in the terms of information flow and 
monitoring that Bainbridge claims. Further, as also argued in Part II.B.2, 
traditional organization imposes indirect costs stemming from lower 
productivity.251 However, it is Marglin’s contention, and mine, that even 
if genuine employee participation might be less costly to the firm, it is 
likely to be more costly to the capitalists and managers. If employees 
had the power to implement decisions that favored their interests, 
owners might suffer reduction in their own net share of the profits even 
if the firm’s profits were equal or greater, and the managers would 
probably be less well compensated, having fewer opportunities to pursue 
their own interests in extracting rent at the expense of investors, owners, 
or employees, to the extent that they were hired at all. But unless the 
costs of traditional management threatened the survival of the firm and 
thus the employment status of the workers, its costs are burdens that fall 
on others – the employees and, with regard to managerial rent-seeking 
and other inefficiencies in corporations, on shareholders. 
On the other hand, the benefits of participatory organization for 
employees–higher wages, job security and employee rights, profit-
sharing, and participation, insofar as it promotes these–are costs for 
capitalists and managers. The productivity gains to the firm that these 
policies created would do not offset those costs to the owners and 
managers unless they captured the resulting profits, or, more plausibly, 
as much or more than they do under traditional organizational forms. 
Bainbridge, discussing a proposal for mandatory employee involvement 
                                                          
 250. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of 
hierarchical management). 
 251. See supra Part II.C.  
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in health and safety issues entertained by Congress in 1992, estimated 
that the plan would impose increased direct costs of over $10 billion on 
private sector employers, and he states that greater employee 
participation in a wider range of issues would be more even costly to 
employers.252  He does not consider any offsetting gains to the firms due 
to greater productivity. And conversely, these costs to capitalists and 
managers would not be costs to the workers as long as those with 
decision-making power did not take all or part of the costs out of worker 
compensation. From the point of the view of the firm as an entity, 
market pressures would not require capitalists or managers to impose 
these costs on employees’ compensation because participation does not 
reduce productivity, and seems not to threaten profitability, i.e., the net 
proceeds available to the firm.253  Pace Lane, the choice to put the costs 
of traditional organization on employees is not market driven. It has 
other sources. 
What those sources might be is illuminated if we consider the 
possibility that the costs of some such program as Congress considered 
might come out of the share of residual income that goes to the owners 
and managers—profits and managerial salaries and bonuses. Needless to 
say, this is quite unlikely to happen as long as the firms are capital-
managed and the employees do not have an effective voice in firm 
decision-making about matters like the relative share of the residual 
income that goes to capital versus labor.  So the costs and benefits for 
workers do not appear in the capitalists’ calculations as such at all. In 
fact they appear as the reverse: costs for capitalists are benefits for 
                                                          
 252. Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 4, at 709–10 (citing H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-663 (1992)).  In considering any such direct costs, however, potential 
offsetting factors should be taken into consideration, Bainbridge himself admits that 
participatory management is a way to reduce or bypass additional layers of 
management. Id. at 684, 696. He also observes that firms nonetheless resist giving real 
managerial power to workers. Id. at 683–84. A flatter hierarchy and more participation 
might produce a net cost saving. In Mondragon, “there are few layers of bureaucracy 
intervening between co-op members and decision makers.” MORRISON, supra note 180, 
at 80. Morrison calls this “the efficiency secret behind Mondragon’s success.” Id.  The 
plywood cooperatives “use significantly fewer supervisors than their conventional 
counterparts . . . one or two per shift of 70 workers as opposed to five to seven in 
conventional firms,” GUNN, supra note 180, at 111.  Whether and to what extent 
genuinely participatory management might cancel or reduce the additional costs of 
quasi-participation simply overlaid on traditional hierarchies deserves more 
investigation. See supra notes 107–08. 
 253. See supra Part II.C (arguing that employee participation enhances productivity 
and, in all likelihood, profitability). 
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workers and vice versa. But, and this is the point, it is the capitalists 
who, in virtue of their ownership of the enterprise, call the shots. 
To state the point differently, capital-managed firms tend to be 
organized hierarchically not because such a form of organization is more 
productive—it is not—but because capitalists are interested not in 
productivity per se, nor even in profitability as such, but in profits that 
they retain as residual claimants in virtue of ownership rights.  In public 
choice terms, they are interested in enhancing rent even at the expense 
of productivity. (This need not be conscious, but only the effect of the 
choices they make in virtue of the control they exercise.) Traditional 
organization, that is to say, is more profitable for owners and managers 
in capital-managed firms, even if it may be less profitable for the firms 
as such. Capitalists and managers have little or no incentive to take into 
account the costs that organizational decisions impose on employees as 
long as these do not reduce profits flowing to themselves.  If an 
employee participation model is not as or more profitable for the owners 
and managers as compared to methods chosen by the typical firm in the 
sector, overall, the firm will not implement it.254  Even if it is equally or 
more profitable, they are unlikely to implement it if it means 
implementing practices or forms that are costly to them,  even if not 
costly to the workers or indeed to the firm. In the vocabulary of public 
choice theory, the explanation lies in rent-seeking behavior and 
principal-agent conflicts. Ironically, what Marglin, following Marx, 
                                                          
 254. Or, under Alchian’s thesis, the firm will not prosper or survive in the long run 
if they do, at least if other firms in the sector chose differently. Alchian carefully 
qualifies his Darwinian hypotheses by stating that the market tends to select the most 
productive methods that are tried. See Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 19, 32. 
Such experimentation happens less often than one might expect because of the general 
interests of owners and managers in capturing a larger share of net profit or enterprise 
income (rent-taking), so that more productive methods that threaten these interests are 
eschewed across the board. And when it comes to a choice of enhancing productivity 
through employee participation versus means such as reducing labor costs through 
automation, the same interests will induce the decision-makers to prefer these other 
means.  
  For these reasons, it is often only when the situation is really desperate that 
participatory management becomes a real option. Consider again the fate of the 
American automobile industry, which persisted in antiquated forms organizational 
forms and technologies, and not until very late in the game, with increased worker 
participation, with an arrogance and blindness that seems in retrospect positively 
willful, and ultimately met with the iron hand of market discipline. It was not until very 
late in the game, that they responded, in a partial and uncoordinated way, with a bare 
modicum of increased worker participation. See, e.g., HALBERSTAM, supra note 143. 
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would call exploitation of labor by capital also involves exploitation, in 
open corporations, of investors by their representatives on the board and 
in any traditional firm, of owners (capitalists or shareholders) by 
managers. 
This is how I understand Marglin’s claim that “[a] lack of 
discipline and supervision could be disastrous for profits without being 
inefficient,”255 read together with his statement that during the early 
industrial revolution, the hierarchical, then novel, but, now traditional, 
factory system triumphed over the putting-out (independent contracting) 
system256 because in the latter as compared with the former, “[d]iscipline 
and supervision, it must be understood, were inadequate only from the 
point of view of the capitalist, not from the point of view of the 
worker.”257  I understand Marglin to say not that less hierarchical 
practices were overall less profitable period, but that they were less 
profitable for the group that, in virtue of its decision-making powers, 
grounded in legally enforced property rights or delegation thereof to 
managers, made the decisions about organizational structure.258  He 
writes: 
                                                          
 255. Marglin, supra note 14, at 91. 
 256. This was essentially the system of subcontracting work to independent 
household contractors rather than hiring employees gathered under a single factory 
roof.  Id. at 96–97. 
 257. Id. at 91. 
 258. Another reading of Marglin is possible, at least with regard to his explanation 
of the origin of the factory system, as opposed to its reproduction and functioning. 
Marglin suggests that less external supervision would have reduced overall firm profits, 
not just the owner’s share: an “alternative . . . that would have allowed the worker a 
measure of control over process and product,” supra note 14, at 96, might have been “at 
the cost of a lower level of output and earnings.” Id. He states that less supervision and 
higher wages in the eighteenth century meant that workers “chose to work less,” id. at 
92, manifesting a “preference for leisure,” id. (citing contemporary observations of the 
“indiscipline of the laboring classes, or more bluntly, their laziness,” id. at 91).  See 
E.P. Thompson, Time Discipline, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 58 PAST 
AND PRESENT II 57, 73 (1967) (stating that “[t]he work pattern was one of alternative 
bouts of intense labour and of idleness, wherever men were in control of their own 
working lives.”). 
  This is puzzling, because Marglin’s main thesis is that the factory system was 
not triumphant because it was more productive. Moreover, this notion does not square 
with historical systematic use of direct legal compulsion (enclosure, Poor Laws, and the 
like) rather than markets to impose factory discipline, which would not have been 
economically required if the factory system was overall more productive and profitable. 
However, attitudes towards work may have been different in the early decades of the 
factory system, so that, in that era, greater worker control might have reduced overall 
productivity, thus profits. Today, however, the evidence is that participatory 
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To grow and develop in nineteenth century Britain —–(or twentieth 
century America)—. . . alternatives [that would have allowed a 
measure of worker control of process and product]  would have had 
to be have been profitable for the organizer of production. . . . [I]t is 
hardly surprising that the development of capitalism...did not create 
a long list of employment opportunities in which workers . . .  could 
control product and process.259 
Alchian’s survival thesis does not explain which form of 
organization will triumph—traditional versus more or less genuinely 
participatory organization—as long as both forms are at least equally 
profitable or efficient. We have seen that, as measured by productivity, 
more participatory forms have a significant productivity advantage.260  It 
is the structure of ownership of the firm, not any advantage in 
productivity, which determines the extent and limits of worker 
participation. The individuals with the ultimate power to determine the 
management structure will tend to choose a form of organization that is 
in their own interests. 
But the costs of participatory practices come out of capitalists’ 
share of profit, reducing their opportunities for rent-taking. Far from 
imposing lower wages on workers, participation even in capital-owned 
firms may impose lower profits on capitalists and managers, if not on 
firms, partly because it might involve higher wages, greater benefits, 
more job security, and increased safety and health measures. Therefore 
owners and managers resist such measures. Because of their status as 
residual claimants, the owners have ultimate decision-making power 
about organizational form, and because traditional organizational forms 
                                                                                                                                      
management is at least as effective at avoiding shirking or “laziness” as hierarchy. See 
supra Part II.C., and that workers have a high preference for work. See supra notes 
155–61 and accompanying text (reviewing Lane’s results concerning work as such as a 
positive utility). 
 259. Marglin, supra note 14, at 96. The ellipses remove the phrase, “[s]ince worker 
control...ultimately leaves no place for the capitalists.” My version of the argument 
does not require acceptance of this thesis. That is a separate argument from his point 
here, and mine in this Article as well, that the costs and benefits fall on different groups, 
with the groups that make the decisions placing the costs on others. See supra notes 
230, 254 and accompanying text. It is enough for my account that genuine participatory 
management would reduce the ability of the owners and managers of capital-owned 
firms to appropriate a larger share of the profits at the expense of the workers, even if 
the owners did have an essential role in production. 
 260.  See, e.g., supra notes 191–200 and accompanying text (documenting the 
productivity-enhancing effects of employee participation). 
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benefit them as owners, they prefer these forms. That is why capitalist 
firms do not institute genuine participation that gives real authority the 
workers, despite its superiority with respect to productivity and 
superiority or at least neutrality as to overall profitability. If it is asked, 
why capital-owned firms do not adopt the more productive participatory 
organizational structures, the answer is that if the benefits of the 
additional productivity flow to the workers rather than the owners and 
managers, they have no incentive to do so. The market will not punish 
them for using their legal authority to impose the costs of lowered 
productivity on the workers—quite the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
This, then, is my answer to the puzzle posed in the Article by the 
curious fact that most firms “are characterized not by participatory 
democracy but by hierarchies in which decisions are made on an 
authoritarian basis.”261 Capitalist firms and corporations maintain 
traditional authoritarian hierarchies, or install employee participation 
programs without giving employees real power, despite the fact that 
genuine employee participation would  enhance efficiency (using 
productivity as a proxy), and, presumably, profits. Why? To answer a 
question with a question: the explanation lies in the ancient query, Cui 
bono? To whose benefit? 
We might expect the contrary result, granting for argument’s sake 
the Alchian “evolutionary” hypothesis, the supposition that the market 
selects for efficient (profitability enhancing) features, including 
organizational structures. Even the Potemkin village employee 
participation programs that are more or less widely adopted in modern 
market economies, allowing for employee involvement without 
employee authority—voice without say—measurably enhance 
efficiency over traditional forms of organization in a wide variety of 
firms. Moreover, the more genuine they are, the more real power they 
give to employees, the more effective they are in improving productivity 
and other measures of performance. 
It is a reasonable supposition that they would be even more 
effective, more productive, and more profitable for the firms if they 
gave the employees on the shop and office floor a real say and included 
employee representatives as equals in the boardroom. If the present-day 
decision-makers, capitalists or their managerial agents, do not embrace 
                                                          
 261. Bainbridge, Organizational Failures, supra note 25, at 1004. 
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such measures, why does the market not force them on these firms 
simply on grounds of efficiency alone, weeding out authoritarian 
hierarchies and selecting enterprises that give more say to the employees 
over firms that use employee participation as a managerial tool in which 
the workers have voice but the managers, and ultimately the owners or 
their agents have the say? 
We considered the hypothesis, urged in different ways and using 
different conceptions of efficiency, by Nozick, Lane, and Steele, that the 
mere fact that genuine employee participation is rare shows that it must 
be inefficient compared to authoritarian hierarchy or merely advisory 
employee participation because otherwise the market would do just that. 
This proposition was defective in three ways. First, it begged the 
question. Second, it failed to indicate any mechanism whereby 
participation would lower productivity. Third, it invoked notions of 
efficiency that are at most results, not causes, offering the market no 
grip for selection among forms of organization. 
We then turned to Bainbridge’s attempt to fill in a non-question 
begging causal story that would show why authoritarian management 
was more efficient. But the factors Bainbridge identified, viz., 
hierarchy’s purported superiority as (1) a mechanism for transmitting 
information to the decision-makers, and (2) a system for monitoring 
employees to discourage shirking, did not hold water. The information 
theory begged the question by assuming the decision-makers were the 
owners or managers rather than the employees. It also ignored Hayekian 
epistemological concerns about the failures of large hierarchical 
organizations to transmit accurate information to the decision-makers in 
a form that would not lead to cognitive overload, poor decision-making, 
and inefficiency of the sort that laid waste, for instance, to the U.S. auto 
industry. The monitoring explanation fared no better. Bainbridge 
assumed without evidence that shirking is a systematic problem because 
even meaningful work was a disutility, whereas psychological evidence 
is that such work, in general, is on the contrary, on the balance, one of 
the most preferred of human activities. Further, Bainbridge himself 
brought forth extensive evidence that employee participation promotes 
effective self-monitoring and horizontal mutual monitoring. He failed to 
offer any comparison of the relative costs of authoritarian and 
hierarchical versus egalitarian and participatory monitoring. And he did 
not adequately explain why the managerial monitors themselves were 
not subject to the opportunism as those whose opportunism they were 
charged with preventing. 
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In the end, however, the inefficiency explanations were red 
herrings. The evidence is clear and strong that employee participation, 
even voice without say, enhances productivity and other aspects of 
enterprise performance better than traditional organization. The two real 
questions are (1) how much better? And (2) what makes it better? To the 
first question, there is no unitary answer, but even the low end estimates 
it is enough better to give market selection a hold.262 To the second 
question, the answer is that what makes it better is the degree to which it 
approaches genuine employee participation with real say: the more 
authority and reward a program gives the employees, the better it 
works.263 But this only highlights the puzzle. Why doesn’t everybody do 
it? 
My answer, suggested by Stephen Marglin’s historical analysis of 
the rise of the factory system and the public choice theory of rent-
seeking, is that it matters who has the legal right and practical power to 
decide what is done with the additional residual income due to a 
performance-enhancing innovation—here, organizational practices 
involving employee participation.  Giving workers a say as well as a 
voice, might increase profits over merely giving them voice without say, 
as do actually existing employee participation programs; it might well 
increase productivity; and, other things being equal, it might increase 
firm profitability.  Data from existing employee participation plans 
suggest that these effects are real and significant. But a say would also 
give the employees power with respect to what happened to those 
profits.  The evidence of labor-managed firms cooperatively owned by 
workers, is that, with real power, employees, even in capital-managed 
firms, would tend to use some of those profits in ways that made their 
own lives better—instituting more equal and possibly greater pay, 
greater job security, and so forth.  This would reduce rent-taking 
flowing to owners and managers due to traditional organizational 
structures. 
Clearly, the market would frown if employees with real say did not 
use some of the additional residuals to benefit the firm and, in open 
corporations, the shareholders. But the money, either way, would not go 
to the capitalist owners or to the corporate managers, whose ranks would 
be severely depleted by the flattened hierarchies of genuinely 
participatory firms. And those are the individuals who, under existing 
                                                          
 262.  See supra notes 3 and 203 (stating Alchian’s thesis about evolutionary 
advantage in the market). 
 263.  See supra notes 192–93. 
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ownership relationships, have the power to decide on an organization 
form. The costs to employees are not costs to them, and vice versa. They 
would rather have a larger slice of a smaller pie than the other way 
around. It is true that the market would favor firms that made such 
changes. But it is a reasonable prediction from public choice theory, 
among other sorts of explanation, that because of this divergence of 
interest, almost none will. The market can only operate on variations 
that are tried.264 Genuine employee participation is extremely unlikely to 
be one of these variations as long as the law supports the more or less 
unqualified rights of the owners and their agents to decide on 
organizational form. 
 
                                                          
 264. See Alchian, Uncertainty, supra note 3, at 32 (stating that the comparative 
efficiency of different “patterns of behavior and organization are predictable . . . if they 
are tried.”). 
